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General Miley
#21
(09-18-2021, 08:44 PM)hollodero Wrote: Well... there might be a counter-point to that. For one, the pentagon discusses all kinds of utopic scenarios, that's part of the job. China will not act based on an utopic scenario though. I have my doubts that there was danger China might do a preemtive strike against the US because Trump is a dumb, ignorant person with a grossly overblown sense of self-importance. That's what they could factually base their fear on. 

Not sure what a "utopic scenario" is in this context. 

According to Milley, the concern was that Chinese intel itself put a misleading product before the Chinese command. Likely that C intel was not based upon Trump's "ignorance" but upon 1) US Naval manuvres, 2) signals intel (SIGINT) and some Human intel, 3) interpreted through knowledge of how autocrats typically behave when faced with loss of power and Trump's behavior match to that (which was also driving "traitorous" JC and Defense behavior). So it was the assessment of our INTEL regarding Chinese intel, not a "utopic" guess by Milley, which prompted his reach out to his Chinese counterpart.

The US intel on Chinese intel would have included at least two levels--those who collected it (possibly SIGINT), and those who interpreted it and turned it into a "product" to be read by Defense, the Brass, and the NSC. That product would also have a paragraph assessing its own "confidence" as high, medium, or low. If it exists, then it is the institutional product of many people, read by at least a dozen, and will be accessible to Congressional supoena. Mark Esper apparently wanted to address the problem with open communication. He put in place a policy to address the problem at lower levels. If this reporting is correct, then Milley's calls were of a "follow up" nature to overtures already made. https://www.axios.com/mark-milley-woodward-trump-crisis-bb8a80b1-3e3a-492b-934a-99825cc6ef7f.html?utm_campaign=organic&utm_medium=socialshare&utm_source=twitter

(09-18-2021, 08:44 PM)hollodero Wrote:  There's not really an example of Trump going completely rogue and do something crazy totally on his own. He did not command any strikes or other aggressive actions nilly-willy and against everone's advice. I'm not trying to be devil's advocate, I just see this danger of China panicking and striking preemptively as a bit thin. Or I guess a reach.

In my view, Trump went "completely rogue" when he trashed the Iran Deal. You are inserting odd qualifiers here, like "on his own." That Trump was not "acting alone" in some of his descisions is not comforting, when we consider who was acting with him, and whom he replaced with whom.  I must remind you of what you already know--

You understand that he brought us to the brink of war with Iran--three times that we know of. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-backstory-of-why-trump-ordered-the-killing-of-suleimani-is-becoming-more-clear

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/i-cant-even-look-at-the-atrocities-us-troops-say-trumps-syria-withdrawal-betrayed-an-ally/2019/10/15/4e79b600-eeca-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html

He fired or forced out all who tried to check him, right? Even Neo cons. Who was left in November, 2020, as he began to "pack" the Pentagon with his own yes men?  https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gen-hr-mcmaster-resigning-national-security-adviser/story?id=53948256
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-led-up-to-trumps-firing-of-john-bolton
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/09/mark-esper-fired-defence-pentagon-donald-trump
(09-18-2021, 08:44 PM)hollodero Wrote: In general (damn), I can clearly understand why people might see Milley's action as an overreach. Trump, after all, appears weak and easily outplayed to many people. I can see a man in Milley's position, and with certainly everyone else totally agreeing that Trump is a moron, being seduced to usurp powers he should not usurp. And I can see how he did that here. Stating what he would do or what he would disobey etc. in a certain scenario is one thing, one I could get behind. But actively contacting China and doing back channel diplomacy, that is something else. I want to defend the man, for sure I can understand a possibly understandable sense of moral obligation and all that. But he overstepped in a serious matter and has to face the consequences, and probably sacrifice his job. After what I'd see as careful consideration, I for myself can hardly see a way around this conclusion. I more than gladly take one if I'm shown one.

Trump may seem weak and easily outplayed by foreign dictators, but in his own cabinet, he fired people right and left for not endorsing crazy.

Final points here: 

1. So far as I can tell, the assumption was not that Trump might actually carry out a nuclear strike (though who knows how the Chinese might assess that), but that he might deliver a crisis-producing ultimatum, order aggressive US actions (as he did in the Gulf) which risk/provoke kinetic reaction from the Chinese. Were the Chinese to respond to a perceived buildup or unplanned move--like moving an exercise ahead two weeks because of a COVID calculation--by a corresponding build up, it could create a high risk situation in which each side may feel forced to attack the other in self defense. Just as Trump needed a statement on Biden by the Ukraininan president, not an actual investigation, so in this case Trump would need to produce the appearance of crisis, not an "actual" one. A person with normal risk assessment capacity can see what is wrong with this scenario, but not the guy who ordered the drone strike on Suleiman. 

2. So far, Milley's calls to a Chinese general appear a separate issue, legally, from Milley's apparent efforts to require that he be notified in case Trump went for the football. Critics rightly point out he is not in the chain of command.  

Our understanding of 1 and 2 now awaits Milley's testimony before a Congressional Hearing.  If it is confirmed he broke the chain of command, crossed the lines between civilian and military control, then he will perhaps have to be punished--as Trump was not when he sought to deploy the military illegally on US soil against US citizens.  

Nati is quite right to keep reminding us that Milley's actions, right or wrong, are response to a much larger problem--an unhinged Commander in Chief. All discussion/resoultion of the Milley affair need to keep that in mind, and oppose the Fox "deep state" version now stridently peddled on the Right.
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#22
Just more proof that Trump was so incompetent and unpredictable even the people he hand picked to work with him didn't trust him or his judgement.

As for the morality of his actions, I don't have an understanding of how often he is supposed to be in contact with this Chinese general as part of his job. If norms were broken, then I'd support an investigation into his conduct and removal of it is clear he went outside his professional duties.

It's not like this country has a shortage of generals that could fill that role anyway. 
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#23
The arguments being made in this thread are why I don't support him being brought up on charges. It was unprecedented times, he was in an unprecedented situation, and his intentions were likely noble. However, he still seems to have violated the constitutional power structure of our armed forces with his words and actions. For this reason, he should no longer being the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
"A great democracy has got to be progressive, or it will soon cease to be either great or a democracy..." - TR

"The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little." - FDR
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#24
(09-19-2021, 01:18 PM)Dill Wrote: Not sure what a "utopic scenario" is in this context. 

The context is that part of your point was that things were so dire even the generals were contemplating counter-measures. I don't think their discussing measures necessarily means the scenarios they talk about are likely or even realistic. Eg. that generals discuss a possible attack on China ordered by Trump doesn't add much realism to this option. They still discuss it, like they discuss the possibility of all kinds of conflicts and wars that don't come to pass or are not really expected to.


(09-19-2021, 01:18 PM)Dill Wrote: According to Milley, the concern was that Chinese intel itself put a misleading product before the Chinese command. Likely that C intel was not based upon Trump's "ignorance" but upon 1) US Naval manuvres, 2) signals intel (SIGINT) and some Human intel, 3) interpreted through knowledge of how autocrats typically behave when faced with loss of power and Trump's behavior match to that (which was also driving "traitorous" JC and Defense behavior). So it was the assessment of our INTEL regarding Chinese intel, not a "utopic" guess by Milley, which prompted his reach out to his Chinese counterpart.

But there weren't any overtly aggressive manouvres or any sort of cumulating troops near the Chinese border or things of that nature, as far as I know.
I can not really imagine that the situation really was or could have been so frightening to Chinese leadership that they could reach the point of "oh my, an attack on us seems inevitable, our only option is to strike the US first". Imho, that takes the specific fears too far. It seems somewhat more realistic to me that General Milley, for noble reasons or not, overreached in a manner that I can not really see as an act of disobedience to prevent a war, but rather a bit of a power grab.

I had and have a lot of fears when it comes to Trump and Trumpism, the fear that he could attack or nuke something despite every voice from all generals and everyone wasn't really amongst those fears.
When you counter with "Iran deal", I sure think that cancelling it was a bad move, but it was not a lonely move. Much of republican leadership advocated for that for a long time, and it's not the act of a madman who would also launch a full front attack totally against everyone's advice. Again, he did not really do that. Killing Suleimani was certainly not his lone idea either. Other events like the Syria withdrawal, while certainly a bad move in my eyes as well, also do not lead to that. I can not fathom that Iran deal or Syria withdrawal or assassinating Suleimani would lead the Chinese to the point that they, again, would think an attack on them was so inevitable that striking first was their only option, and the best way to avoid that was Milley calling them and preventing that turn of events. I would not fully believe Milley when he would claim it was.


(09-19-2021, 01:18 PM)Dill Wrote: 1. So far as I can tell, the assumption was not that Trump might actually carry out a nuclear strike (though who knows how the Chinese might assess that), but that he might deliver a crisis-producing ultimatum, order aggressive US actions (as he did in the Gulf) which risk/provoke kinetic reaction from the Chinese.

Well, then maybe that would be the right time for a noble general to undermine his actual deeds. I find it hard though to react minding such a scenario when it in reality did not play out like that. Again, if there was any mass cumulation of troops or any actually disconcerting aggressive moveagainst China ordered by Trump against the general's horrified advice, I could see the reasoning. But actually, Trump's deeds consisted of being ignorant, dumb, anti-democratic and foul-mouthed. They did not consist of being bloodthirsty and aiming for an all out war.


(09-19-2021, 01:18 PM)Dill Wrote: Nati is quite right to keep reminding us that Milley's actions, right or wrong, are response to a much larger problem--an unhinged Commander in Chief. All discussion/resoultion of the Milley affair need to keep that in mind, and oppose the Fox "deep state" version now stridently peddled on the Right.

Sure he is. I see a danger though in claiming the only reaction to that can be to become unhinged and unbound by the rules of a democratic state oneself. It can be in certain scenarios, sure. I doubt this situation with China really was one of those.
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#25
(09-20-2021, 09:55 AM)hollodero Wrote: The context is that part of your point was that things were so dire even the generals were contemplating counter-measures. I don't think their discussing measures necessarily means the scenarios they talk about are likely or even realistic. Eg. that generals discuss a possible attack on China ordered by Trump doesn't add much realism to this option. They still discuss it, like they discuss the possibility of all kinds of conflicts and wars that don't come to pass or are not really expected to.



But there weren't any overtly aggressive manouvres or any sort of cumulating troops near the Chinese border or things of that nature, as far as I know.
I can not really imagine that the situation really was or could have been so frightening to Chinese leadership that they could reach the point of "oh my, an attack on us seems inevitable, our only option is to strike the US first". Imho, that takes the specific fears too far. It seems somewhat more realistic to me that General Milley, for noble reasons or not, overreached in a manner that I can not really see as an act of disobedience to prevent a war, but rather a bit of a power grab.

I had and have a lot of fears when it comes to Trump and Trumpism, the fear that he could attack or nuke something despite every voice from all generals and everyone wasn't really amongst those fears.
When you counter with "Iran deal", I sure think that cancelling it was a bad move, but it was not a lonely move. Much of republican leadership advocated for that for a long time, and it's not the act of a madman who would also launch a full front attack totally against everyone's advice. Again, he did not really do that. Killing Suleimani was certainly not his lone idea either. Other events like the Syria withdrawal, while certainly a bad move in my eyes as well, also do not lead to that. I can not fathom that Iran deal or Syria withdrawal or assassinating Suleimani would lead the Chinese to the point that they, again, would think an attack on them was so inevitable that striking first was their only option, and the best way to avoid that was Milley calling them and preventing that turn of events. I would not fully believe Milley when he would claim it was.


The US intel on Chinese intel would have included at least two levels--those who collected it (possibly SIGINT), and those who interpreted it and turned it into a "product" to be read by Defense, the Brass, and the NSC. That product would also have a paragraph assessing its own "confidence" as high, medium, or low. If it exists, then it is the institutional product of many people, read by at least a dozen, and will be accessible to Congressional supoena. Mark Esper apparently wanted to address the problem with open communication. He put in place a policy to address the problem at lower levels. If this reporting is correct, then Milley's calls were of a "follow up" nature to overtures already made. https://www.axios.com/mark-milley-woodward-trump-crisis-bb8a80b1-3e3a-492b-934a-99825cc6ef7f.html?utm_campaign=organic&utm_medium=socialshare&utm_source=twitter


In my view, Trump went "completely rogue" when he trashed the Iran Deal. You are inserting odd qualifiers here, like "on his own." That Trump was not "acting alone" in some of his descisions is not comforting, when we consider who was acting with him, and whom he replaced with whom.  I must remind you of what you already know--

You understand that he brought us to the brink of war with Iran--three times that we know of. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-backstory-of-why-trump-ordered-the-killing-of-suleimani-is-becoming-more-clear

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/i-cant-even-look-at-the-atrocities-us-troops-say-trumps-syria-withdrawal-betrayed-an-ally/2019/10/15/4e79b600-eeca-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html

He fired or forced out all who tried to check him, right? Even Neo cons. Who was left in November, 2020, as he began to "pack" the Pentagon with his own yes men?  https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gen-hr-mcmaster-resigning-national-security-adviser/story?id=53948256
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-led-up-to-trumps-firing-of-john-bolton
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/09/mark-esper-fired-defence-pentagon-donald-trump

Trump may seem weak and easily outplayed by foreign dictators, but in his own cabinet, he fired people right and left for not endorsing crazy.

Final points here: 


Well, then maybe that would be the right time for a noble general to undermine his actual deeds. I find it hard though to react minding such a scenario when it in reality did not play out like that. Again, if there was any mass cumulation of troops or any actually disconcerting aggressive moveagainst China ordered by Trump against the general's horrified advice, I could see the reasoning. But actually, Trump's deeds consisted of being ignorant, dumb, anti-democratic and foul-mouthed. They did not consist of being bloodthirsty and aiming for an all out war.



Sure he is. I see a danger though in claiming the only reaction to that can be to become unhinged and unbound by the rules of a democratic state oneself. It can be in certain scenarios, sure. I doubt this situation with China really was one of those.

What you're running into here is a recurring scenario.  Certain people here will condemn actions by those they dislike and applaud the exact same actions when committed by someone they approve of.  You've made a very clear and cogent argument as to why Miley's actions were wrong, as have Bel, Bmore and several others.  Take solace in knowing that most of us see the wrongness of an action without regard for our opinion of the person committing it.
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#26
(09-20-2021, 09:55 AM)hollodero Wrote: The context is that part of your point was that things were so dire even the generals were contemplating counter-measures. I don't think their discussing measures necessarily means the scenarios they talk about are likely or even realistic. Eg. that generals discuss a possible attack on China ordered by Trump doesn't add much realism to this option. They still discuss it, like they discuss the possibility of all kinds of conflicts and wars that don't come to pass or are not really expected to.

But there weren't any overtly aggressive manouvres or any sort of cumulating troops near the Chinese border or things of that nature, as far as I know.
I can not really imagine that the situation really was or could have been so frightening to Chinese leadership that they could reach the point of "oh my, an attack on us seems inevitable, our only option is to strike the US first". Imho, that takes the specific fears too far. It seems somewhat more realistic to me that General Milley, for noble reasons or not, overreached in a manner that I can not really see as an act of disobedience to prevent a war, but rather a bit of a power grab.

Yo, Hollo. Sorry I am late responding. At the moment we are talking about Milley's call to a Chinese general; how is that a "power grab" or "disobedience"? What was Milley doing that he--or any Pentagon chief--wasn't doing before? And are you conflating a response to intel judged actionable with war-gaming scenarios and contengency plans? 

All of my points are centered upon Milley's assertion that there was US intel suggesting that Chinese intel might be reading Trump's actions as prelude to some unspecified level of conflict. The questions which follow from this are--Was there such intel? And if so, was Milley's response proper? 

If there was no such, then Milley has told a lie that will be easily exposed. If there was such, then only a few questions remain: What was the level of confidence? What was the expected level of "pre-emption" to be feared--e.g., firing on a ship or plane? And regarding the US response to the intel, were Milley's phone calls in line with precedent, with the threat level? 

My hope would be that those in charge of US national security would not glibly dismiss such intel as not even worth a few phone calls. 

Certainly not on the assumption that Trump has never "really" gone rogue* or "acted on his own." Whatever Chinese intel analysts make of Trump's bust of the Iran Deal, assasination of Suleiman, Syria pullout, and negotiation with the Taliban, and much else, it cannot be that he is a rational actor embedded in a foreign policy apparatus which controls his behavior--especially once all the adults (Mcmaster, Kelly, Esper) were sent from the room. 

The point of mentioning the Iran Deal and Syria pullout etc. is not to establishTrump's penchant for "all out war," but that he is not subject to the same caluculus as every previous president, even as he exactly fits the profile of an autocrat faced with loss of power. Chinese analysists, responsible for their country's security and accountable for intel misjudgments, are just not going to think like those "independent" US voters who five years ago thought US foreign policy would be made mostly by tenured civil servants and Trump would grow into his office, humbled by its awesome responsibility.

Your judgement of Milley's actions, you say, is based in part on your lack of awareness of troop "build ups"and the like, assuming, I guess, that is the only sort of thing which might trigger alarm in Chinese closely monitoring regular naval/air exercises off Korean shores and in the South China sea near Taiwan.

Chinese intel analysists would be constructing an assessment from disparate points, different orders and kinds of evidence, looking for a patterns, not simply "build up" in one place. Perhaps joint exercises by two naval groups, the advance of existing exercise schedules (as apparently occured in Nov.), coupled with the replacement of DOD personnel loyal to the Constitution with Trump loyalists who could be counted on to obey orders, legal or illegal. Not to mention Trump's state of mind. The analysts would be aware of his unprecedented direct attempts to overturn state elections, his Big Lie, his shouting at subordinates and random firings. And of course, his incitement of the assault on the Capitol. Intel produces degrees of probablity, not of inevitability, and the latter is not required for pre-emptive response. 

I'm pretty sure for the DoD and Pentagon the worry was not so much that Trump was going to order a nuclear strike as something smaller scaled, like an aggressive manuvre in the South China sea which might provoke the PRC to down a plane or strike a US ship, to which Trump would then respond, setting off an upward spiral of reprisal--and a state of emergency. Remember the big question motivating the phone calls is as much what China THOUGHT Trump might do as what he actually might do. I think it doubtful that after 2018, much less 6/1, that in t,he course of their assessments, many Chinese analysts uttered the words--"Whoa! I doubt Trump would take it that far." 


*That some of Trump's foreign policy moves were backed by the likes of Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz does make them less "rogueish" in the eyes of our adversaries' policy analysts.
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#27
(09-22-2021, 01:40 AM)Dill Wrote: Yo, Hollo. Sorry I am late responding. At the moment we are talking about Milley's call to a Chinese general; how is that a "power grab" or "disobedience"? What was Milley doing that he--or any Pentagon chief--wasn't doing before? And are you conflating a response to intel judged actionable with war-gaming scenarios and contengency plans? 

All of my points are centered upon Milley's assertion that there was US intel suggesting that Chinese intel might be reading Trump's actions as prelude to some unspecified level of conflict. The questions which follow from this are--Was there such intel? And if so, was Milley's response proper? 

If there was no such, then Milley has told a lie that will be easily exposed. If there was such, then only a few questions remain: What was the level of confidence? What was the expected level of "pre-emption" to be feared--e.g., firing on a ship or plane? And regarding the US response to the intel, were Milley's phone calls in line with precedent, with the threat level? 

My hope would be that those in charge of US national security would not glibly dismiss such intel as not even worth a few phone calls. 

Certainly not on the assumption that Trump has never "really" gone rogue* or "acted on his own." Whatever Chinese intel analysts make of Trump's bust of the Iran Deal, assasination of Suleiman, Syria pullout, and negotiation with the Taliban, and much else, it cannot be that he is a rational actor embedded in a foreign policy apparatus which controls his behavior--especially once all the adults (Mcmaster, Kelly, Esper) were sent from the room. 

The point of mentioning the Iran Deal and Syria pullout etc. is not to establishTrump's penchant for "all out war," but that he is not subject to the same caluculus as every previous president, even as he exactly fits the profile of an autocrat faced with loss of power. Chinese analysists, responsible for their country's security and accountable for intel misjudgments, are just not going to think like those "independent" US voters who five years ago thought US foreign policy would be made mostly by tenured civil servants and Trump would grow into his office, humbled by its awesome responsibility.

Your judgement of Milley's actions, you say, is based in part on your lack of awareness of troop "build ups"and the like, assuming, I guess, that is the only sort of thing which might trigger alarm in Chinese closely monitoring regular naval/air exercises off Korean shores and in the South China sea near Taiwan.

Chinese intel analysists would be constructing an assessment from disparate points, different orders and kinds of evidence, looking for a patterns, not simply "build up" in one place. Perhaps joint exercises by two naval groups, the advance of existing exercise schedules (as apparently occured in Nov.), coupled with the replacement of DOD personnel loyal to the Constitution with Trump loyalists who could be counted on to obey orders, legal or illegal. Not to mention Trump's state of mind. The analysts would be aware of his unprecedented direct attempts to overturn state elections, his Big Lie, his shouting at subordinates and random firings. And of course, his incitement of the assault on the Capitol. Intel produces degrees of probablity, not of inevitability, and the latter is not required for pre-emptive response. 

I'm pretty sure for the DoD and Pentagon the worry was not so much that Trump was going to order a nuclear strike as something smaller scaled, like an aggressive manuvre in the South China sea which might provoke the PRC to down a plane or strike a US ship, to which Trump would then respond, setting off an upward spiral of reprisal--and a state of emergency. Remember the big question motivating the phone calls is as much what China THOUGHT Trump might do as what he actually might do. I think it doubtful that after 2018, much less 6/1, that in t,he course of their assessments, many Chinese analysts uttered the words--"Whoa! I doubt Trump would take it that far." 


*That some of Trump's foreign policy moves were backed by the likes of Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz does make them less "rogueish" in the eyes of our adversaries' policy analysts.

I'm not unsympathetic to this arguments. Not at all. On the other hand though, the US has a certain constitution*, and certain roles for the president, including him being the commander in chief. Undermining these rules, imho, needs extraordinarily dire circumstances. I don't really can amount speculations about the threat level China might have felt as such an extraordinary emergency. Until an armed conflict, and even more so a preemtive Chinese strike, seems like a feasible options there'd be several steps of further escalation first; at some of these theoretical steps, acting would possibly be more understandable in Milley's shoes.

Bat as things stand right now, I see the danger of approving Milley's actions solely based on the fact that they were designed to counter Trump and Trump is a moron. That is, despite all your points, still too thin for me. It wouldn't be applauded probably if some general would undermine Biden in the belief he is mentally too far gone to lead the country the right way. I sure think this assessment is way more understandable in Trump's case, sure; but someone could see that differently and then just point to Milley's deeds as precedent for arbitrary acts. Any rule that you can not do that would be severely diminished if Milley just earns praise and no further consequences for his deeds.

(*that might be the actual problem here)
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#28
(09-24-2021, 07:21 AM)hollodero Wrote: I'm not unsympathetic to this arguments. Not at all. On the other hand though, the US has a certain constitution*, and certain roles for the president, including him being the commander in chief. Undermining these rules, imho, needs extraordinarily dire circumstances. I don't really can amount speculations about the threat level China might have felt as such an extraordinary emergency. Until an armed conflict, and even more so a preemtive Chinese strike, seems like a feasible options there'd be several steps of further escalation first; at some of these theoretical steps, acting would possibly be more understandable in Milley's shoes.

Bat as things stand right now, I see the danger of approving Milley's actions solely based on the fact that they were designed to counter Trump and Trump is a moron. That is, despite all your points, still too thin for me. It wouldn't be applauded probably if some general would undermine Biden in the belief he is mentally too far gone to lead the country the right way. I sure think this assessment is way more understandable in Trump's case, sure; but someone could see that differently and then just point to Milley's deeds as precedent for arbitrary acts. Any rule that you can not do that would be severely diminished if Milley just earns praise and no further consequences for his deeds.

(*that might be the actual problem here)

Thanks for the response, H. 

I fear there may still be some confusion over the point I have been making, which has been limited to Milley's phone calls to Xi. It is not clear to me that these were "arbitrary" acts, or even broke protocol, and therefore set some kind of "precedent" for which there should be consequences. At the moment, it looks to me like the calls were follow up with Esper, who actually took the lead on responding to the Chinese, insuring lower level functionaries were in near constant communication with the Chinese command since July.  The questionable effectiveness of these communications motived Milley to speak to his counterpart. I just found out today that he urged the Admiral in charge of the two carrier groups in the Far East to postpone exercises, and he did. That might be out of line, but I'm not sure. It did lower tensions.

Esper and Milley's motivation was fear that Chinese were drawing the wrong inference from their own intel. This fear was highest during Milley's second phone call, as Xi (from 3rd hand reports) was quite agitated during the Capitol assault. It seemed possible to him that the US government was falling, and he was repeatedly demanding assurances otherwise (according to the Woodward book). (I didn't think the government would fall because of a Trump mob, even as I watched them storm the Capitol, but I also wasn't 100% sure. So how might this look to a military commander in an authoritarian regime? What accountability awaited him if he got it wrong? 

So I have not been urging people to approve Milley's actions (phone calls) because he was countering a moron, but because he was preventing a looming conflict

I have not convinced you that those "steps of escalation" you don't see could easily have looked, from Xi's perspective, to have already been taken. I could say more about this, about the history of US-China interaction in the South China Sea and its complications/precedents for intel, and about Chinese paranoia, but I'd rather wait until Milley has a chance to speak before Congress on Sept. 28. That should be followed by closer and more informed discussions of protocol and military civilian boundaries in the NYT and WaPo. 

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As for Milley's other action--insisting staff and others inform him of any strike orders--there is already a bolder precedent: Schlesinger's similar insistance that he be informed if Nixon reached for the football during the latter's emotionally unstable final days.  https://time.com/5388648/watergate-nixon-anonymous-op-ed/

One particular moment from Nixon’s time offers insight into what it might look like for staffers to manage a President’s potential volatility: In the period before Nixon’s Aug. 9, 1974, resignation, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reportedly ordered certain presidential orders — especially those related to nuclear arms — to be cleared by himself personally or National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

The story goes that Nixon had alarmed Schlesinger and advisors by declaring: “I can go into my office and pick up the telephone, and in 25 minutes 70 million people will be dead.”

As Craig Nelson explains in his history of the atomic age, Nixon embraced the so-called Madman Theory when it came to nuclear weapons. According to that theory, it helped U.S. foreign policy for Nixon to seem a bit crazy because it made potential enemies wary that he might actually use nuclear weapons. But California Senator Alan Cranston wasn’t comforted by that possible explanation. He is said to have flagged Schlesinger on the “the need for keeping a berserk President from plunging us into a holocaust,” as TIME previously reported.


So far as I know, Schlesinger and Cranston were mostly praised and suffered no consequences, in part because "both sides" could agree that Nixon was acting dangerously. Had Fox News existed back then, however, I'm sure this little known incident would have been a terrible scandal,  Nixon's unfitness disputed.  Where there is lacking a common ability to discern standards/incompetence, then it just looks like people condemn actions done by the other side, that they would applaud if done by their own.
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#29
Interesting take here.

 



And just as a general aside there's a lot of talk in this thread about how things are to be done the proper way and following procedure and such when it comes to what Miley did.


I just came across this little tidbit about DJT.  Now obviously it's because he's a super narcissist but also there are rules and procedures to follow concerning when the POTUS is not able to make decisions.  


 



And besides that no one goes for a "routine" colonoscopy w/o prep...in the middle of the day.


My guess is she's lying or was lied to.  

If its true it was not the correct way to handle the situation concerning Pence.
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#30
(09-28-2021, 12:40 PM)GMDino Wrote: And just as a general aside there's a lot of talk in this thread about how things are to be done the proper way and following procedure and such when it comes to what Miley did.

Yeah, looks like most will accept the China calls as routine, and under Esper's direction--everything they should have done in response to the intel they had. 

The charge that Milley was guilty of "treason" and an "attempted coup" because he supposedly inserted himself in the chain of command to block possible nuclear strikes also seems a hyper-exaggeration now. He re-affirmed that he is in the chain of communication/advice as the President's first military advisor. That seems to be what he was emphasizing in the infamous staff meeting about following protocols. 

Thee has to be some pushback on this. Republicans who generally dismiss Woodward's behind-the-scenes reportage are nevertheless using it to infer behavior and lines crossed beyond what the facts presently support.

In any case, if the Republicans can draw people away from Trump's attempts to disrupt the election and into a discussion about whether Milley should design, then mission accomplished.
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#31
(09-24-2021, 10:25 PM)Dill Wrote: Thanks for the response, H. 

I fear there may still be some confusion over the point I have been making, which has been limited to Milley's phone calls to Xi. It is not clear to me that these were "arbitrary" acts, or even broke protocol, and therefore set some kind of "precedent" for which there should be consequences.

Sorry for a late answer, and it's a short one too. Those things are not totally clear to me either, and it would need a person more versed with the US constitution (and whaat really played out behind the curtain) to make such a determination.
Given the situation as described, Milley's actions seem like overstepping his role and undermining a commander in chief to me, in principle. That is not me being confused, that's just what talking to Chinese officials without the president's knowledge appears to be. The specifics of this situation are to an extent unknown to me. Whether say Trump made some concerning remarks or something like that to elevate fears, I do not know, it might be a totally understandable move if I knew about all that. I'm not saying what Milley did is treason or anything of that sort, not even necessarily that it was a loapse of judgment - just that it's a breach of norms and possibly constitutional rules, same as in the Schlesinger-Nixon case you mentioned. That might have been very well an understandable move back then, but it also was not a "normal" move or one the constitution designed. 
And I feel it's worth asking if the situation warranted such a move - and there one can mainly point to hypotheticals, Trump might have ordered this or that or might have made an uber-aggressive move towards China, forcing them to strike first or whatever scenario - there's just little to see to back up a narrative of imminent danger for an armed conflict.
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#32
(09-29-2021, 09:50 AM)hollodero Wrote: Sorry for a late answer, and it's a short one too. Those things are not totally clear to me either, and it would need a person more versed with the US constitution (and whaat really played out behind the curtain) to make such a determination.
Given the situation as described, Milley's actions seem like overstepping his role and undermining a commander in chief to me, in principle. That is not me being confused, that's just what talking to Chinese officials without the president's knowledge appears to be. The specifics of this situation are to an extent unknown to me. Whether say Trump made some concerning remarks or something like that to elevate fears, I do not know, it might be a totally understandable move if I knew about all that. I'm not saying what Milley did is treason or anything of that sort, not even necessarily that it was a loapse of judgment - just that it's a breach of norms and possibly constitutional rules, same as in the Schlesinger-Nixon case you mentioned. That might have been very well an understandable move back then, but it also was not a "normal" move or one the constitution designed. 
And I feel it's worth asking if the situation warranted such a move - and there one can mainly point to hypotheticals, Trump might have ordered this or that or might have made an uber-aggressive move towards China, forcing them to strike first or whatever scenario - there's just little to see to back up a narrative of imminent danger for an armed conflict.

I think what is wanted here is a person more versed in diplomatic protocols, e.g., former secretaries of D and JC staff, intel officers.

1. So far as I know, it was the DoD, with Esper's go ahead, which began lower level communications with China over this "threat" issue back in July. Milley was brought in when it was deemed (by Esper, or Esper and Milley together) that reassurance from someone higher in authority was required. It is my understanding that such communications are frequent enough to have a protocol with operational guidance--and not only with the Chinese. The only question I see here is whether in this case it should fall under the president's radar.  If not, then it is not only Milley who should be on the dock, but Esper, his undersecretary for Far Eastern affairs, and the Joint Chiefs.

2. Regarding Schlesinger's "breach of norms"--that certainly was not "normal" or constitutional--but the comparison was not offered in analogy to the phone calls which, it appears, were quite routine, even if their cause was not. Rather, the comparison was to the allegation that Milley inserted himself in the chain of command to forestall a military strike. So far, it does not appear that Milley actually did that. 

3. With all due respect, Hollo, I must say that your causal analysis has the wrong starting point here. The question is not whether Trump ACTUALLY threatened an "uber-aggressive move towards China" which then got Milley so worried he broke some Consitutional boundary reaching for the phone without telling Trump, taking foreign policy into his own hands. Rather, the issue is what our intel was saying about Chinese intel--I.e., how the Chinese were interpreting 1) US actions in the region, and 2) Trump's political behavior. 

I repeat--the "cause" of the communications with China was not Milley's assessment of Trump but our intel on Chinese intel. THAT is what Milley's calls were responding to. NOT on anything Trump said or did with regard to China. That you saw nothing in the news which you thought should upset the Chinese is not really a strong argument against the existence of US intel indicating their misreading of US intent, or even against the existence of such misreading. 

Again, I do not want to digress, but I would remind everyone that a game of three-dimensional military chess has been going on in the South China Sea since the mid-90s. Without some knowledge of that history, it is difficult to undertand how this over flight or that incursion into claimed territorial waters could provoke; it is impossible to "read" seemingly disconnected events like the Chinese shooting down their own satellite and surfacing a diesel sub amidst a US carrier group off Guam. There is a system of kinetic signalling involved here which can't simply be gleaned from daily news or understood by laypersons.

Also, why should one suppose Chinese intel focused only on military actions in their territorial waters, uncoupled from events in Washington? It has to be as clear to our adversaries, as it is to our allies, that Trump was constesting his lost election, fomenting unrest, breaking US law, in floundering efforts to stay in power. He was replacing people in the DoD who did or might question the legality of his orders. Why bother, if he were about to step down? If I am a Chinese intel analysis, that would be FAR MORE concerning to me than a third carrier group on its way to join the two already in theater. 

Finally, were I training US intel analysts to assess Chinese intel, my first step would to be to insert them into practice scenarios in which the Chinese have two carrier groups manuevering off the Coast of California, 28,000 troops in Vancouver, Canada, and Alsaka has claimed independence from the US and concluded a defense treaty with China. This would help our analysts understand why their intel, diplomacy and military manuevres might frequently seem excessively paranoid to us.
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#33
(09-29-2021, 02:41 PM)Dill Wrote: 3. With all due respect, Hollo, I must say that your causal analysis has the wrong starting point here. The question is not whether Trump ACTUALLY threatened an "uber-aggressive move towards China" which then got Milley so worried he broke some Consitutional boundary reaching for the phone without telling Trump, taking foreign policy into his own hands. Rather, the issue is what our intel was saying about Chinese intel--I.e., how the Chinese were interpreting 1) US actions in the region, and 2) Trump's political behavior. 

I repeat--the "cause" of the communications with China was not Milley's assessment of Trump but our intel on Chinese intel. THAT is what Milley's calls were responding to. NOT on anything Trump said or did with regard to China. That you saw nothing in the news which you thought should upset the Chinese is not really a strong argument against the existence of US intel indicating their misreading of US intent, or even against the existence of such misreading. 

So, there's the point that maybe this is actually all routine. I would not dare to state the opposite with total conviction. If it was just routine and actually no big deal, then ok, so be it.
If it was not, however, then I would still believe that it is the president's perogative to deal with foreign nations, including taking a more aggressive stance. If he does so, it's imho in principle kind of essential that no one calls someone from said nation to relativize or undermine these positions. I can clearly see a point at which such a preventive deed is the right move; but that would very much include a realistic scenario that an armed conflict might break out. Anything less than that, I'd still believe that the president's perogative should stand and that someone like Milley is not the person to question it.
Regarding intelligence reports, I of course would not know about those, and I figure neither would you. So it's kinda easy to claim the Chinese had to be heavily concerned and US intelligence possibly reflected that. I have no evidence it did not, nor do I have evidence it did. I just find it somewhat hard to imagine that China could be worried about a possible attack or a possible war, in which case, well done Mr. Milley if you averted the threat of war. If they felt threatened in some other way than with actual armed conflict, then I'd lean towards claiming Milley should not interfere. And I can understand an other perspective on this, I see Trump after all; I just don't believe mine has a wrong starting point or speaks to my confusion.
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#34
(09-29-2021, 03:36 PM)hollodero Wrote: So, there's the point that maybe this is actually all routine. I would not dare to state the opposite with total conviction. If it was just routine and actually no big deal, then ok, so be it.
If it was not, however, then I would still believe that it is the president's perogative to deal with foreign nations, including taking a more aggressive stance. If he does so, it's imho in principle kind of essential that no one calls someone from said nation to relativize or undermine these positions. I can clearly see a point at which such a preventive deed is the right move; but that would very much include a realistic scenario that an armed conflict might break out. Anything less than that, I'd still believe that the president's perogative should stand and that someone like Milley is not the person to question it.
Regarding intelligence reports, I of course would not know about those, and I figure neither would you. So it's kinda easy to claim the Chinese had to be heavily concerned and US intelligence possibly reflected that. I have no evidence it did not, nor do I have evidence it did. I just find it somewhat hard to imagine that China could be worried about a possible attack or a possible war, in which case, well done Mr. Milley if you averted the threat of war. If they felt threatened in some other way than with actual armed conflict, then I'd lean towards claiming Milley should not interfere. And I can understand an other perspective on this, I see Trump after all; I just don't believe mine has a wrong starting point or speaks to my confusion.

It isn't the president's "prerogative" to deal with foreign nations so much as Constitutionally defined powers/responsibilities for him, with Congressional oversight. He is the US' #1 representative of state.

However, the US is "dealing" with over 100 nations every day. It is not possible for him to personally manage all that--hence the State Department, among others, with its secretary, undersecretaries, deputies, and many subdepartments--all communicating daily with their thousands of counterparts in other nations.  
 
And then there is the DoD and the intel services, foremost among them the CIA, also dealing with foreign nations.
 
But I get from the bolded above that you still think Milley usurped the president's job somehow, undermined his position or whatever, by calling the Chinese to say Trump was not going to attack. I don't get that. He was working under Esper's direction, right? Who was questioning Trump's "prerogative" here? 
 
Also, today Milley maintained that all these communications with China were in the president's Personal Daily Briefing. Who knows if Trump read them or cared. I tend to believe Milley on that since there is a record of every such PDB which can be checked.
 
Finally, regarding the intel neither of us has seen. We do know Milley claims it existed and no one in the DoD is disputing that it did. I just want to re-iterate here that the call prompted by that intel was not simply a whim of Milley's, but an organized, directed effort conducted and monitored by the DoD, and in which Milley actually had a role subordinate to Esper's. 
 
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