Russia begins moving troops into eastern Ukraine

[Forever Spinning Vinyl]

(03-23-2022, 02:20 PM)Nately120 Wrote: Funny you should mentioned that, but people act like cancel culture is new but I've been in skits and I've made music and albums and stuff for the past 20+ years and my friends and I would joke that none of us could run for office after making this stuff.

I own up to it.  

Sammy Hagar when asked about the "Sammy For President" signs hoisted by the fans at the show

"No. No. No. . . . No. They wouldn't even have to break ground to dig for dirt, especially in the Van Halen years"

[*michaelsean*]

(03-23-2022, 02:20 PM)Nately120 Wrote: Funny you should mentioned that, but people act like cancel culture is new but I've been in skits and I've made music and albums and stuff for the past 20+ years and my friends and I would joke that none of us could run for office after making this stuff.

I own up to it.  

Don't you have to be something in order to be cancelled? 

[Dill]

(03-18-2022, 06:16 PM)hollodero Wrote: Dill Wrote:Regarding the bolded, remember what I am questioning is whether Putin was "always" what he is now, and always aiming to expand Russia to former Tsarist dimensions or whatever. Most of the bolded matches statements and behavior since 2014. Certainly not pre-2007.

Well, you also claimed Putin isn't Putin any more and that he has changed within the last 2-3 years. Which, overall, I doubted. The expansionist ideas came clear after the Krim annexation at the latest, but imho they were visible long before that. Putin always tried to increase his power and influence, by the means that he deemed to be at his disposal at the time. Eg. creating vassal states like Belarus and other dictatorhips he supports, or the Georgia war in 2008. If he was like that from the very beginning of his tenure, it's hard to tell. He's in power since 1999, a long time not to change at all. It could be that he changed drastically and "lost it" so to say, I just don't really see it, I rather see someone finally following through on long-held plans and goals.

 Sorry my response is a late, Hollo. I have been pecking away at this for a week now, as I think much analysis I am seeing on tv submerges social causation driven by material circumstances under the discussion of Putin's personality/character. Now I have to break the response into three parts. So here is Part I:
......................................................................................................................................................................................

What I argue is that there has been a change in Putin’s behavior and public reasoning, which has become pronounced over the last few years, perhaps going back to 2018. Before he was rational, pragmatic and a political “realist,” in the polysci sense that he took determination and protection of national interest as his primary goal, with special attention to 19th century style balancing of power blocs. If anything, the primary goal of his first two terms in office was to ally with the Atlantic powers—first the US and then France and Germany. His alliances were acceptable so long as useful to them, and when Russia was easily discarded post-2003, that increased his concerns about a unipolar world led by a US which still regarded Russia as an adversary (e.g., as expressed in his Munich conf. speech in 2007). Remember the neo-cons were in charge of US foreign policy during Putin’s first two terms, and their point man, VP Dick Cheney, told staff members that the US goal was not just to break up the USSR, but Russia itself, so that it could never again challenge the US.

Where you see “long-held plans and goals” leading to the invasion of Georgia and the theft of Crimea, I see a train of events linked primarily to justified concern over NATO expansion—nothing “special” about Putin’s pushback here. It should be expected of any Russian leader. I understand why the US would not allow missiles in Cuba during the Cold War, and why it would never have allowed Canada or Mexico to become Warsaw Pact signatories even if they were “free” to do so. So I don’t find much mysterious in Putin’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine (in 2014). The goal was to signal NATO and the EU—STOP!! A warning which they ignored.

Georgia for example—you’ve offered no evidence of any previous “plan” to incorporate it into Russia. Why didn't he complete that incorporation in 2008, striking when the iron was still hot? As I recall in 2008, when NATO signaled willingness to admit Georgia (bordering already troubled Chechnya and Dagestan), Saakashvili, responding to attacks on Georgian soldiers after a separatist had been killed, then invaded South Ossetia, thinking NATO would back his play. It did not. In response, Putin briefly invaded, and recognized two new mini-republics to help buffer Georgia, and greatly weakening it. From the Russian point of view, that was a successful management of the problem. You mentioned the creation of “vassal states” like Belarus, and Ukraine under Yanukovych would also count. But these follow P’s rather easy acceptance of the Lithuania, Lativia and Estonia as NATO members. That the expansion did not stop, that NATO and the EU continued to encourage Ukraine to join them was understandably worrisome from the Russian POV.

As for the annexation of Crimea, again, this seems driven by events within the country as much as anything else—Yanukovych is booted in favor of pro EU (but not especially competent) Turchynov, the legislature proposes a law stripping the Russian language of its official status. Following the Ossetian precedent primarily Russian Crimea wants to secede and Russia recognizes the “will of the people.” The Russians already have base there, so they don’t have “invade.” And the top Ukrainian officer in Crimea defected to the Russian side. The only “plan” I see here is a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, and Putin reacting to events AFTER the Y’s ouster.

The current invasion departs from the precedents of 2008/14. Rather than biting of a small chunk of a country and weakening the rest, Putin has sought to actually invade the whole (though keeping the whole may not be his intent). And he has greatly miscalculated risks and costs. 

[hollodero]

(03-24-2022, 06:43 PM)Dill Wrote: What I argue is that there has been a change in Putin’s behavior and public reasoning, which has become pronounced over the last few years, perhaps going back to 2018.

I don't question that change. For sure, the Putin that invades Ukraine does behave quite differently from the one holding Winter Olympics and the like. Imho, that doesn't prove that he mentally changed, or declined as you seem to infer.

(03-24-2022, 06:43 PM)Dill Wrote: Georgia for example—you’ve offered no evidence of any previous “plan” to incorporate it into Russia. Why didn't he complete that incorporation in 2008, striking when the iron was still hot?

I can't really prove much of what I assume, for sure. I also don't know if 2008 Putin already planned for a 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Chances are he did not.
I can offer an explanation why he did not incorporate Georgia then and there - he maybe simply didn't feel up to it. He went as far as he could without risking serious repercussions. NATO and the west needed substantial weakening first.
When the Russian propaganda attacks on the west started on a large scale - and this is not solely about the US - that's when I'd say there always was an endgame to that. But I can not know what he was thinking and planning, how could I. I have a hard time to believe though that back in 2008 and in the upcoming years his one and only goal was to protect the status quo from an evergrowing NATO threat (which, I'd agree, was an understandable worry). Imho, the status quo at the time was not satisfactory for him, for a man that again always mourned the end of the Soviet Union, as the end of Russia being a superpower. He wanted to participate in the big game of chess that decides the fate of the world and, imho, suffered greatly from being more or less excluded from that and being merely seen as a leader of a weak and miniscule country with no real sway. But, again, I can not prove that, or that along with that he harborded expansionist plans (imho a logical conseqnence of aspiring greater might for his Russia). It's just how I've always seen him, especially after he started his propaganda warfare against Europe and the US.

That's all for now, since you announced additional parts to your answer.

[Sociopathicsteelerfan]

(03-25-2022, 05:42 AM)hollodero Wrote: I don't question that change. For sure, the Putin that invades Ukraine does behave quite differently from the one holding Winter Olympics and the like. Imho, that doesn't prove that he mentally changed, or declined as you seem to infer.



I can't really prove much of what I assume, for sure. I also don't know if 2008 Putin already planned for a 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Chances are he did not.
I can offer an explanation why he did not incorporate Georgia then and there - he maybe simply didn't feel up to it. He went as far as he could without risking serious repercussions. NATO and the west needed substantial weakening first.
When the Russian propaganda attacks on the west started on a large scale - and this is not solely about the US - that's when I'd say there always was an endgame to that. But I can not know what he was thinking and planning, how could I. I have a hard time to believe though that back in 2008 and in the upcoming years his one and only goal was to protect the status quo from an evergrowing NATO threat (which, I'd agree, was an understandable worry). Imho, the status quo at the time was not satisfactory for him, for a man that again always mourned the end of the Soviet Union, as the end of Russia being a superpower. He wanted to participate in the big game of chess that decides the fate of the world and, imho, suffered greatly from being more or less excluded from that and being merely seen as a leader of a weak and miniscule country with no real sway. But, again, I can not prove that, or that along with that he harborded expansionist plans (imho a logical conseqnence of aspiring greater might for his Russia). It's just how I've always seen him, especially after he started his propaganda warfare against Europe and the US.

That's all for now, since you announced additional parts to your answer.

Hollo gets what so many do not.  Russia has always had a massive inferiority complex in relation to Europe, and later the West as a whole.  Russians are a very proud people and the only time they were treated with any deference was during the USSR days.  They are essentially the national example of it's better to be feared than loved.  The Russians want to be respected and they generally don't care what form that respect takes.  Understand this and Putin's maneuvers make perfect sense.  Of course, the invasion is actually proving to be embarrassing, but I guarantee he never envisioned that.

[HarleyDog]

(03-25-2022, 12:48 PM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: Hollo gets what so many do not.  Russia has always had a massive inferiority complex in relation to Europe, and later the West as a whole.  Russians are a very proud people and the only time they were treated with any deference was during the USSR days.  They are essentially the national example of it's better to be feared than loved.  The Russians want to be respected and they generally don't care what form that respect takes.  Understand this and Putin's maneuvers make perfect sense.  Of course, the invasion is actually proving to be embarrassing, but I guarantee he never envisioned that.

Taking from your points of pride and embarrassment, these are things which make his future judgements unstable and unpredictable. I don't put it past him to use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons at any moment. Although I don't think biological weapons are his specialty, the others are definitely in his wheelhouse. In a time when the West should be iron fisted, my fear in the long game is we end up giving in and picking lessor evils to attempt to end this crisis. IMO, this would be the worst thing we could do.

[Dill]

(03-25-2022, 05:42 AM)hollodero Wrote: I can offer an explanation why he did not incorporate Georgia then and there - he maybe simply didn't feel up to it. He went as far as he could without risking serious repercussions. NATO and the west needed substantial weakening first.
When the Russian propaganda attacks on the west started on a large scale - and this is not solely about the US - that's when I'd say there always was an endgame to that. But I can not know what he was thinking and planning, how could I. I have a hard time to believe though that back in 2008 and in the upcoming years his one and only goal was to protect the status quo from an evergrowing NATO threat (which, I'd agree, was an understandable worry). Imho, the status quo at the time was not satisfactory for him, for a man that again always mourned the end of the Soviet Union, as the end of Russia being a superpower. He wanted to participate in the big game of chess that decides the fate of the world and, imho, suffered greatly from being more or less excluded from that and being merely seen as a leader of a weak and miniscule country with no real sway. But, again, I can not prove that, or that along with that he harborded expansionist plans (imho a logical conseqnence of aspiring greater might for his Russia). It's just how I've always seen him, especially after he started his propaganda warfare against Europe and the US.

Just a quick note on this while I get my other ducks in order--

I am in part arguing an analogy here, between US and Russian FP. 

Did the US want missiles out of Cuba or undermine legitimate governments in Guatemala, Chile, and Nicaragua simply because it "wanted to participate in the big game of chess that decides the fate of the world"?  While I have disagreed with many such actions in the past, I have never have never assumed US leaders did what they did because it felt good to be important in the world. Fear of Communism, though often unfounded, and damaging to "freedom," was a real fear. 

What I am seeing in yours and others' comments is a reluctance to recognize that, from the Russian perspective, NATO encroachment was and is a real threat to Russian national interests. Cheney told Gorby he saw no reason why the US should not continue to "break up" Russia after the collapse of the USSR. And the US behaved that way afterwards.

I am concerned by the tendency on this board and on tv commentating to view three decades of instability in Eastern Europe as something simply emanating from Putin, substituting analysis of personality for analysis of foreign policy. No doubt Putin has become an autocrat, and that increases legitimate resistance in former satellites to incorporation in Russia's near abroad. But I think it quite wrong to suppose the current crisis would have happened no matter how Putin/Russia were treated from '99 to the present because we "feel" Putin always wanted the empire back.

The US, after promising NOT to back NATO expansion, ran it right up to Russia's borders. And when Russia pushes back, that's just them not wanting to appear weak? They've been trying to reconstitute their empire all along? 

PS If, in the Georgian case, Putin went as far as he could without repercussion, that suggests he was more rational than he is now, doesn't it? He clearly did not bite off more than he could chew. He drew a red line and maintained it--and still hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics.

PPS you frequently refer to cyberattacks, not just against the US. But these two correlate better with my hypothesis than yours, as it appears to have first become a thing in resisting NATO encroachment in Estonia and Georgia--only later becoming a problem in Europe. Once Putin abandoned the notion of working with first the US, then Germany and France, THEN we see him actively undermining the politics of those countries--mostly post 2014.

[Dill]

(03-18-2022, 06:16 PM)hollodero Wrote: If he was like that from the very beginning of his tenure, it's hard to tell. He's in power since 1999, a long time not to change at all. It could be that he changed drastically and "lost it" so to say, I just don't really see it, I rather see someone finally following through on long-held plans and goals.

Part II:  Putin in his own words

Do you have evidence of "long-held plans" etc.? I am going by interviews, biographies, and auto biographies by Gorby and Richard Gates--but primarily by Putin's own speeches and their correlation to Russian FP at the time given. 

A. 2001--A baseline for evaluating change in Putin's worldview and goals is the speech he gave before the Bundestag on Sept. 25. I found an English transcript,https://larouchepub.com/other/2001/2838putin_bundestag.html,* but you might be better served by the video. Here it is on Youtube--a youthful, alert Putin addressing the German nation in the language of Goethe. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0_0WqUuh9E

I don't expect you to listen to the whole thing, but you might dip in at 6:55 where he describes terrorism as a security concern and affirms his agreement with Bush that nations must band together to defend against it (while continuing to recognize that Muslims will also be our partners in this). That is followed, from 10:10  to 13:53, with a reminder that nations should work together as partners, consulting one another about international security arrangements. Common regional security measures have been determined without Russian input, and then the Russia has been expected to affirm and accept them afterwards. "Is that normal?" etc. etc. 

Also important, the final run of the speech emphasizes, not the unity of Russia with Ukraine, but the unity of European culture, and of the tremendous cultural debt of Russia to Germany. He goes on and on about how German literary masterpieces are translated so carefully into Russian and how, despite the two world wars, they share so much. 

As it plays out over the the next decade, of course, German security interests over the past 75 years and now deeply embedded democracy and consumer culture make its US alliance more than a transactional and transitory thing of the moment. (It was this "deeper" alliance which was always threatened by Trump's "but what have they done for us lately" approach to FP.) 

B. 2007--in the famous Munich Security conference speech, the emphasis on "multi-polarity" and working within established international economic and security frameworks is still there, but there is no affirmation of unity with the US, which is described (correctly) as a global hegemon with the power to make unilateral decisions affecting global security without reference to the UN, which P thinks is the only institution which can legitimate interstate violence. He grouses somewhat about the expectation of some European countries (e.g., Italy), that the EU and NATO are equally legitimate venues for discussion of regional security affecting non-EU and NATO members. But the speech itself is, from the perspective of "Realism," quite rational and unobjectional. https://aldeilis.net/english/putins-historical-speech-munich-conference-security-policy-2007/  

Also, between 1999 and 2007, are you aware of any cyberattacks on European governments? Putin funding Trump-style political parties in France or Germany? I am not.

C. 2021--A and B contrast sharply with Putin's  "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" of 2021, which is unapologetically irredentist, arguing for a historical and spiritual unity of northern Slavs, grounded in a common origin in the 9th century Kievan Rus. The ploy of literary connection is again used (e.g., Gogol was Ukrainian), but RELIGION is the crucial glue and the historical bond which makes the Ukrainians and Russians one people, divided now apparently by the machinations of those outside the Slavosphere whose known tactic is to divide and conquer. It was the 19th century Catholic "Polish elite," desiring to regain their 17th-18th century control of the region, who fomented the notion that Orthodox Ukraine was a separate nation, though its people had now for 500 years looked to Moscow for protection of their religion and cultural identity. In the later 19th century it was the Austro-Hungarian empire which furthered this "lie" in its contest with Russia for control of Eastern Europe. And of course during WWI, post Brest-Litovsk, Germany and A-H signed separate treaties with Ukrainians in return for wheat, continuing to affirm independence as a means of weakening Russia. In this essay, Europe is no longer the center of common culture which includes Russia, but a collection of "external forces" working across centuries to pry Bela-, Novo, and Malorussians from mother Russia. When the USSR was founded in 1922, that darned Lenin incorporated Ukraine (and other former Tsarist controlled principalities) as "Republics" with the sovereign right to join or leave the union of soviets. A terrible mistake and mischaracterization, fragmenting what was a spiritual and cultural unity. (Putin says he is not idealizing, but he clearly is, and edging towards the "spiritual" rhetoric of early 20th century fascism as well.)

I don't want to summarize anymore perfunctory and poorly spun history--enough to say here that the argument is that, with the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine should have reverted back to Russian control, the whole "Republic" designation having been a mistake [like the administrative transfer of Crimea from Moscow to Kiev under Kruschev back in '57]. P mentions his St. Petersburg mentor, Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, who argued that once Soviet "republics" declared the '22 constitution invalid, they should have reverted back to Russian provinces. Now U and R have one common economy and only the "elites" there are driving the nationalist narrative, in cahoots with those other "external" powers who want to weaken Russia. 

Regarding the latter part of his argument, he is quite right that "external" powers have sought and still seek to divide Ukraine from Russia, but he leaves out the agency/sovereignty of Ukrainians themselves, who see clear advantages in allying with the big Atlantic players. He begins to sound rather like Walt Rostov back in 1965 insisting that "Moscow" was the real driver of resistance to Diem and successive RSVN regimes, even as he claims it is for the people of Ukraine, and not outsiders, to decide their path forward. Possibly in reference to the notorious Azov Battalion, a neo-Nazi militia incorporated into the Ukrainian Army in 2014, Putin's final paragraphs refer to neo-fascist forces within Ukraine who threaten ethnic Russians in the Donbas and work with a national leadership as a tool of the West, against the Ukrainian people and their interests. (He is writing this three years after our own US Congress explicitly prevented military aid from going to the Azov.) 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

So why lay out this contrast between Putin then and now, in Putin's own words? The first two documents would pass muster with Russian** FP experts and historians as competent representations of national interest, with a chance of engaging international cooperation in shared goals. Reading them, in correlation with the Russian government's actions, suggests not that Putin is "out of touch" with reality and his intel community, but rather quite on top of that reality and playing the Russian hand rather competently. No dictator trap yet.

The 2021 document could hardly be so validated, though P's own experts would likely grant that the Atlantic West has indeed worked to diminish Russia and check its power by dominating its near abroad. 

The R-U "Unity" essay is a middle finger to the international community; its audience is not "the West" nor even the Russian policy establishment, but the domestic audience long-aggrieved by disappointment with the US and Europe and rocked by economic depression/recession. It is not a signal or a request for the international community to work with and respect Russia. Rather Russia (Putin) is laying out groundwork for a new policy which doesn't require "permission" from or cooperation with Atlantic power, seeding pretexts (like neo-Nazism) for later claims they have been "well known" and "already noted." And it follows five years of active meddling in European and US elections. Russia doesn't care anymore if we don't like that. This is a great distance from 2007.
 
Now contrast the low-risk invasion of Georgia and annexation of Crimea to the current invasion of the Ukraine. You've argued Putin "wasn't ready" for his big imperial push back then, as if now he were all consolidated and ready, but I would argue 1) that he was not ready for the Georgian invasion either, or the Crimean annexation, and knew it, but events on the ground forced his hand.  He also definitely was not ready for the current invasion of Ukraine, but DIDN'T know that. Your hypothesis is he was always the meglomaniac ready to restore imperial Russia; mine is that his information environment has greatly degenerated (the dictator trap), or he has suffered a sharp mental decline (onset of dementia?), or both. lol well I'll stop here or I'll probably never stop.

*lol from Lyndon Larouches' "Executive Intel" site. He was a pre-internet Alex Jones. 
**I mean Russian nationals here, not just area experts from the US and Europe.

[NATI BENGALS]

Wonder if that story is true I saw earlier. If it is it's one of those mixed emotions deals.

Russian soldier apparently ran over his commander's legs with a tank because of all the losses the unit had taken. Happy about some rebellion within the ranks of the invaders. Sad it took a bunch of death to get to that point.

[hollodero]

(03-25-2022, 01:51 PM)Dill Wrote: Just a quick note on this while I get my other ducks in order--

I am in part arguing an analogy here, between US and Russian FP.

I get that. I just don't think it's a perfect analogy. The US under Kennedy et al. is not really an equivalent of Putin's post Soviet-era Russia.

(03-25-2022, 01:51 PM)Dill Wrote: What I am seeing in yours and others' comments is a reluctance to recognize that, from the Russian perspective, NATO encroachment was and is a real threat to Russian national interests.

I did recognize that as an understandable worry.

(03-25-2022, 01:51 PM)Dill Wrote: I am concerned by the tendency on this board and on tv commentating to view three decades of instability in Eastern Europe as something simply emanating from Putin, substituting analysis of personality for analysis of foreign policy.

Well, this is about Putin in the end, he orders the attacks and he can stop it. You claimed that he is not Putin anymore, after all, making it about him just as much as everybody.

(03-25-2022, 01:51 PM)Dill Wrote: But I think it quite wrong to suppose the current crisis would have happened no matter how Putin/Russia were treated from '99 to the present because we "feel" Putin always wanted the empire back.

I'm not just "feeling" it though. There are enough words of Putin that makes the conclusion he wants the empire back a bit more than just a little Austrian's gut feeling. Eg. just because you portray Putin calling Russians and Ukrainians being one people as a 2021 thing, it very much is not. He said similar stuff back in 2014, repeatedly.
You seem to regard all his steps up to now as defensive moves against the aggressively expanding NATO. I don't think that is totally wrong, but I think that is too simple an explanation.

(03-25-2022, 07:34 PM)Dill Wrote: Do you have evidence of "long-held plans" etc.?

No. My secret sources inside the Kremlin all got unmasked.

But look, honestly, this back and forth occupies lots of space and I feel we're taking this thread over and suffocating it with this debate, and regarding the current circumstances I think this is not really appropriate. So I will try to shorten my answers, don't take it as me ignoring all the stuff you say. You already got me with your first question, no, I do not have evidence. I just interpret his words very differently. Eg. when he emphazised the importance of the war against terror, he used this as a figleaf to devastate Chechnya in the name of said war against terror. I always found it cynical and not meant to be constructive, but deliberately hypocritical. You seem to think he was earnest and only the NATO and the US soured his constructive approach throughout the years, turning this sober and measured KGB man into a cynic. I don't think so. I always saw him as a cynic.

(03-25-2022, 07:34 PM)Dill Wrote: Russia doesn't care anymore if we don't like that. This is a great distance from 2007.

I agree with that. He initially tried soft power, now he's trying hard power, that's apparently different.
I see his approach as being overly simplistic in both instances though. Hey, let's have the soccer world championships and all the other stuff, let's play nice, be a diplomat, be all charming, the world will respect Russia after that, NATO will dissolve for a lack of threat. Did not work. He tried to undermine the west with cyber attacks and sponsoring right-wing parties all over Europe and later the US. That will dissolve NATO and give him free reign. Hey, that didn't work either. So now, let's use blunt force to reach what I always thought was his ultimate goal (a mightier Russia, being a superpower again) and see the west being cowards that don't care while Ukrainians just flee in terror or celebrate their saviour. Yeah that did not work either, but imho that isn't really something new. I for one always saw Putin as overly presumptuous, regarding his opponents on the world stage as primitive, easy to figure out and manipulate, and not up to his savvyness. I know that's just an anecdote, but he brought a dog to a meeting with Merkel, because Merkel is afraid of dogs, so she will just give him everything in terror, clear as day right? That's how he actually thinks he can conduct world politics.

(And just a sidenote, he was especially sharp with my own country [that he even had the time to care about us is astonishing enough], apparently being totally blindsided by our not being on his side --- even though he was at our foreign minister's wedding and played so nice, what the country did not roll over after that??? He apparently earnestly can not believe that.)

(03-25-2022, 07:34 PM)Dill Wrote:  
Now contrast the low-risk invasion of Georgia and annexation of Crimea to the current invasion of the Ukraine. You've argued Putin "wasn't ready" for his big imperial push back then, as if now he were all consolidated and ready, but I would argue 1) that he was not ready for the Georgian invasion either, or the Crimean annexation, and knew it, but events on the ground forced his hand.  He also definitely was not ready for the current invasion of Ukraine, but DIDN'T know that.

I think his time is running out.

(03-25-2022, 07:34 PM)Dill Wrote:  
Your hypothesis is he was always the meglomaniac ready to restore imperial Russia; mine is that his information environment has greatly degenerated (the dictator trap), or he has suffered a sharp mental decline (onset of dementia?), or both.

Yep, that sums it up.

[Dill]

(03-18-2022, 06:16 PM)hollodero Wrote: It could be that he changed drastically and "lost it" so to say, I just don't really see it, I rather see someone finally following through on long-held plans and goals.

Which, btw. is a counter-argument to your idea he fell into this dictator trap. He's in power for 23 years, seems like he did well in avoiding the ultimate consequences of said trap so far. Of course there are hints that his system has severe flaws; for example it seems like he was grossly uninformed about the actual state of the military and the apparently vast amounts of investment that oozed in someone's pocket and no one dared to tell him. One can see that as manifestation of said trap.

But then again, I'm a bit sceptical about the absoluteness of your article's conclusion. Often it seems to me as if journalist's opinion pieces are too reliant on inductive inferences, meaning if I see ten white sheep I can claim that every sheep is white. Putin is a special sheep though.

Part III  I know you don't want to "flood the thread," but this post deals with application of theory, and I already had it worked up, so I'm going to post it anyway.
............................................................................................................................................
Yes, Putin’s behavior NOW aligns with indications of a “dictator trap.” It wasn't there in 1999 or even 2007 because the trap must be created over time. When generals and the like can publish public criticisms of Putin, as they could during his first two terms, and Putin must respect constitutional term limits, the “trap” is not yet there. Rather the “trap” aspect of his immediate environment seems to have become a factor post 2014.  

Can you cite some evidence of expansive tendency, in Putin's statements or behavior pre-2007?

Is there an alternative to reliance on “inductive inferences” in policy and diplomacy?  You’d be relying on such yourself were your contention that Putin is exceptional also supported with specific observations; that it is not so supported is not a strength. If Putin is a “special” dictator/sheep in this case, then you need to offer some evidence he is not like the other ten.  

(03-18-2022, 06:16 PM)hollodero Wrote: Dill Wrote:But I don't think that behavior was there when he allied himself with the US against Al Qaeda and gave the US flyover rights and accepted a "temporary" base in Tajikistan without objection. This alliance with the US was not welcomed by all. 18 retired generals signed a letter of protest, in the belief it was to Russia's strategic advantage NOT to help the US. Putin went against them.

That might have been a propaganda choice though. Putin has discovered the war against terrorism as a wonderful reason to lead his own battles like in Chechnya. It might appear harder to sell these lines if one on the other hand hinders actions taken in the name of said war against terror.

“Might” have been a what??? Why isn’t “Terrorism” itself as the Atlantic West defines it, a “wonderful reason” to seek alliance in dealing with the international problem? Remember that Chechens actually invaded nearby Dagestan in 1999, and Chechnya was already subdued before Putin sought the Bush alliance. Remember the Moscow apt. bombings of 1999 and the Moscow Theater massacre of 2002. To think of this alliance as a “propaganda choice” negates recognition of this violence as a real, serious problem, challenging the stability of a Russian state with some 20 million Muslims inside its borders, armed and some with cultural affiliation to the Taliban and other nefarious groups, not to mention the risk to former Soviet states still counted as part of the Russian “near abroad.”

[hollodero]

(03-26-2022, 12:57 PM)Dill Wrote: Part III  I know you don't want to "flood the thread," but this post deals with application of theory, and I already had it worked up, so I'm going to post it anyway.

Didn't mean to tell you not to. I rather explained why I won't address you at full length. Especially since I can't give iron-clad evidence that my perception of Putin was correct at all times.

(03-26-2022, 12:57 PM)Dill Wrote: Can you cite some evidence of expansive tendency, in Putin's statements or behavior pre-2007?

I don't know what was in his head before 2007. I think he hardly had the means back then. However, there was a policy in place that aimed for Russia being a counterweight to the west (Primakov doctrine), which includes aiming for more influence and hence power. But that is an interpretation. As I interpret the creation of vessel states as a form of expansionism.

(03-26-2022, 12:57 PM)Dill Wrote: Is there an alternative to reliance on “inductive inferences” in policy and diplomacy?

Maybe not, but this was about journalism and finding the truth. That there's no alternative way to state the truth doesn't mean this way is the correct one. I do refute the notion that every autocratic system is bound to end up in an isolated leader that gets bad advice. It's not a law of nature. Imho.

(03-26-2022, 12:57 PM)Dill Wrote: “Might” have been a what??? Why isn’t “Terrorism” itself as the Atlantic West defines it, a “wonderful reason” to seek alliance in dealing with the international problem? Remember that Chechens actually invaded nearby Dagestan in 1999, and Chechnya was already subdued before Putin sought the Bush alliance. Remember the Moscow apt. bombings of 1999 and the Moscow Theater massacre of 2002. To think of this alliance as a “propaganda choice” negates recognition of this violence as a real, serious problem, challenging the stability of a Russian state with some 20 million Muslims inside its borders, armed and some with cultural affiliation to the Taliban and other nefarious groups, not to mention the risk to former Soviet states still counted as part of the Russian “near abroad.”

I disagree that I was neglecting violence from the Chechnyan side. First off, they fought for independence, which sometimes the world approves and sometimes it does not. But for sure, the means the Chechnyan separatist leaders chose are to be condemned in quite some instances, no doubt. But that doesn't mean that Putin was the good guy fighting evil terrorists, imho. Russian troops, in response, devastated Grosny and other cities like they do in Mariupol now, probably at least 70.000 civilians got killed, Putin then installed a brutal autocrat in sham elections, that commits severe human rights violations up to this day, along with the Russian troops. Now I can see how the war against Chechnyan rebels can be seen as a part of a war against terror, or as necessary even to preserve Russian unity; but that does not justify everything done in the name of said war against terror. And if Putin uses this global fight against terrorism as justification for all that, then I'd say it's propaganda.

[*michaelsean*]

(03-25-2022, 07:34 PM)NATI BENGALS Wrote: Wonder if that story is true I saw earlier. If it is it's one of those mixed emotions deals.

Russian soldier apparently ran over his commander's legs with a tank because of all the losses the unit had taken. Happy about some rebellion within the ranks of the invaders. Sad it took a bunch of death to get to that point.

That will definitely leave a mark.

[GMDino]

Fortunately for Putin there are still a few real Patriots "just asking questions" to help defend him! 



Unlike those communist/socialist Democrats!!! 

[Sociopathicsteelerfan]

Ukraine sank the Moskva, a cruiser and the Black Sea flagship.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-big-loss-russia-is-sinking-moskva-missile-cruiser-2022-04-15/

While certainly not a big deal in terms of affecting the ground based invasion this is an irreplaceable loss for the Russians. The ship was old, but they can't afford to replace surface ships of that size, even before all of the sanctions. Yet more egg on the face of the increasingly inept Russian military.

[BigPapaKain]

(04-15-2022, 12:22 PM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: Ukraine sank the Moskva, a cruiser and the Black Sea flagship.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-big-loss-russia-is-sinking-moskva-missile-cruiser-2022-04-15/

While certainly not a big deal in terms of affecting the ground based invasion this is an irreplaceable loss for the Russians.  The ship was old, but they can't afford to replace surface ships of that size, even before all of the sanctions.  Yet more egg on the face of the increasingly inept Russian military.

Apparently that was also a declaration of war by Ukraine according to Russia.

Maybe if they're at actual war, the Russians will stop bombing civilian targets and raping women and children. I doubt it, but you never know.

Paper tigers are the best.

[TheUberHuber]

There were "probably" a couple nukes onboard as well. Regardless of the inept captain doing predictable maneuvers and getting distracted by a medium drone, the ships systems should have been able to detect the missiles and shoot them down. Brings up a bunch of questions on their competence and state of their weapons systems as a whole. 2 missiles from 50 miles away should have been easy to defend for that ship.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10721351/Ukraine-war-Fears-Moskva-warship-carrying-nuclear-weapons-sank.html


-- also, anyone want to go nuke hunting??

[BigPapaKain]

(04-16-2022, 09:16 PM)TheUberHuber Wrote: There were "probably" a couple nukes onboard as well. Regardless of the inept captain doing predictable maneuvers and getting distracted by a medium drone, the ships systems should have been able to detect the missiles and shoot them down. Brings up a bunch of questions on their competence and state of their weapons systems as a whole. 2 missiles from 50 miles away should have been easy to defend for that ship.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10721351/Ukraine-war-Fears-Moskva-warship-carrying-nuclear-weapons-sank.html


-- also, anyone want to go nuke hunting??

That depends - do you think we'll find a nuke that's actually fire capable or do you think we'll find a half rusted out shell of a nuke with expired radioactive parts?

Because if you believe the former, I'm gonna need you to buy this bridge in Dodge City first lol

[Belsnickel]

It seems that Putin has ditched all the pretext and has just acknowledged this move is plain old imperialism.

Wow, Putin basically just stopped pretending: "During the war with Sweden, Peter the Great didn't conquer anything, he took back what had always belonged to us, even though all of Europe recognised it as Sweden's. It seems now it's our turn to get our lands back [smiling]". pic.twitter.com/vgk60hT5ea

— Tadeusz Giczan ?? (@TadeuszGiczan) June 9, 2022

[CKwi88]

(06-11-2022, 10:04 AM)Belsnickel Wrote: It seems that Putin has ditched all the pretext and has just acknowledged this move is plain old imperialism.

Wow, Putin basically just stopped pretending: "During the war with Sweden, Peter the Great didn't conquer anything, he took back what had always belonged to us, even though all of Europe recognised it as Sweden's. It seems now it's our turn to get our lands back [smiling]". pic.twitter.com/vgk60hT5ea

— Tadeusz Giczan ?? (@TadeuszGiczan) June 9, 2022

Hopefully president Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh of Mongolia isn't taking notes.

Hardly a sustainable position from Putin, but he clearly isn't operating rationally. I suppose there is something refreshing about a world power like Russia acknowledging blatant imperialism, but still, the guy can't die soon enough.