General Miley

[hollodero]

(09-22-2021, 01:40 AM)Dill Wrote: Yo, Hollo. Sorry I am late responding. At the moment we are talking about Milley's call to a Chinese general; how is that a "power grab" or "disobedience"? What was Milley doing that he--or any Pentagon chief--wasn't doing before? And are you conflating a response to intel judged actionable with war-gaming scenarios and contengency plans? 

All of my points are centered upon Milley's assertion that there was US intel suggesting that Chinese intel might be reading Trump's actions as prelude to some unspecified level of conflict. The questions which follow from this are--Was there such intel? And if so, was Milley's response proper? 

If there was no such, then Milley has told a lie that will be easily exposed. If there was such, then only a few questions remain: What was the level of confidence? What was the expected level of "pre-emption" to be feared--e.g., firing on a ship or plane? And regarding the US response to the intel, were Milley's phone calls in line with precedent, with the threat level? 

My hope would be that those in charge of US national security would not glibly dismiss such intel as not even worth a few phone calls. 

Certainly not on the assumption that Trump has never "really" gone rogue* or "acted on his own." Whatever Chinese intel analysts make of Trump's bust of the Iran Deal, assasination of Suleiman, Syria pullout, and negotiation with the Taliban, and much else, it cannot be that he is a rational actor embedded in a foreign policy apparatus which controls his behavior--especially once all the adults (Mcmaster, Kelly, Esper) were sent from the room. 

The point of mentioning the Iran Deal and Syria pullout etc. is not to establishTrump's penchant for "all out war," but that he is not subject to the same caluculus as every previous president, even as he exactly fits the profile of an autocrat faced with loss of power. Chinese analysists, responsible for their country's security and accountable for intel misjudgments, are just not going to think like those "independent" US voters who five years ago thought US foreign policy would be made mostly by tenured civil servants and Trump would grow into his office, humbled by its awesome responsibility.

Your judgement of Milley's actions, you say, is based in part on your lack of awareness of troop "build ups"and the like, assuming, I guess, that is the only sort of thing which might trigger alarm in Chinese closely monitoring regular naval/air exercises off Korean shores and in the South China sea near Taiwan.

Chinese intel analysists would be constructing an assessment from disparate points, different orders and kinds of evidence, looking for a patterns, not simply "build up" in one place. Perhaps joint exercises by two naval groups, the advance of existing exercise schedules (as apparently occured in Nov.), coupled with the replacement of DOD personnel loyal to the Constitution with Trump loyalists who could be counted on to obey orders, legal or illegal. Not to mention Trump's state of mind. The analysts would be aware of his unprecedented direct attempts to overturn state elections, his Big Lie, his shouting at subordinates and random firings. And of course, his incitement of the assault on the Capitol. Intel produces degrees of probablity, not of inevitability, and the latter is not required for pre-emptive response. 

I'm pretty sure for the DoD and Pentagon the worry was not so much that Trump was going to order a nuclear strike as something smaller scaled, like an aggressive manuvre in the South China sea which might provoke the PRC to down a plane or strike a US ship, to which Trump would then respond, setting off an upward spiral of reprisal--and a state of emergency. Remember the big question motivating the phone calls is as much what China THOUGHT Trump might do as what he actually might do. I think it doubtful that after 2018, much less 6/1, that in t,he course of their assessments, many Chinese analysts uttered the words--"Whoa! I doubt Trump would take it that far." 


*That some of Trump's foreign policy moves were backed by the likes of Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz does make them less "rogueish" in the eyes of our adversaries' policy analysts.

I'm not unsympathetic to this arguments. Not at all. On the other hand though, the US has a certain constitution*, and certain roles for the president, including him being the commander in chief. Undermining these rules, imho, needs extraordinarily dire circumstances. I don't really can amount speculations about the threat level China might have felt as such an extraordinary emergency. Until an armed conflict, and even more so a preemtive Chinese strike, seems like a feasible options there'd be several steps of further escalation first; at some of these theoretical steps, acting would possibly be more understandable in Milley's shoes.

Bat as things stand right now, I see the danger of approving Milley's actions solely based on the fact that they were designed to counter Trump and Trump is a moron. That is, despite all your points, still too thin for me. It wouldn't be applauded probably if some general would undermine Biden in the belief he is mentally too far gone to lead the country the right way. I sure think this assessment is way more understandable in Trump's case, sure; but someone could see that differently and then just point to Milley's deeds as precedent for arbitrary acts. Any rule that you can not do that would be severely diminished if Milley just earns praise and no further consequences for his deeds.

(*that might be the actual problem here)