Israel/Hamas War Superthread

[Dill]

(05-23-2024, 08:34 PM)hollodero Wrote: Well, how do you know all that? You paint it as quite an undisputable fact that barring Iran everyone is so unhappy and disgusted with Hamas and that they have no sway at all. Is that really a fact.
Eg. Iraq paints the Hamas attacks as a natural consequence of the Zionist occupation authority's oppression. The official Syria 'raises its head high in honor of the martyrs of the Palestinian revolution and the heroes who planned and achieved the Al-Aqsa Flood operation'. That aren't quite the words to describe the deeds of a pariah. At the very least it's a bit more complicated than that.

Rather than argue over definitions, I readily conceded that calling Hamas a "pariah" was going too far, They are not ISIS. I also now reconsider that one Muslim nation may NOT wish to be rid of them.  Perhaps you are actually wondering whether Muslim nations in the ME are "unhappy and disgusted with Hamas" at all, or at least to what degree? The following points in response, then. 

First: my stating that Hamas is "necessary to resolve the current war and, further down the road, to construct a future for Gaza and perhaps a Palestinian state,"
with representatives sitting at gov. tables in Egypt, Qatar etc., is not exactly a claim that they have "no sway at all," is it? So no need to defend a claim I don't make.

Second: You ask how I "know all that"? What I "know" comes from polling friends in Jordan and Egypt and from following ME polls, news sources, and websites, which I've been doing for decades and not just when a single event gets the Arab-Israeli conflict into US news. (E.g., the Washington Institute is a useful source for polling on Arab populations' political views. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/washington-institute-2023-polling-data-and-analysis.) And then, upon absorbing info from these diverse sources, placing it in what historical/political context I can muster, I conduct my own media/political analyses of what's currently happening by comparative method, not "trusting" sources.

Third: Remember I am speaking of governments. Populations vary quite a bit in their Hamas support, high in Jordan and very low in Egypt and the Gulf states, even accounting for a post Oct 7 spike in popularity. Governments can be embarrassed by Hamas' erratic behavior at the negotiating table, and by the shifts and splits Hamas creates among their own populace, and the resulting stress on governance and diplomatic initiatives.*  

E.g., Those viewing the Hamas attacks as "a natural consequence of the Zionist occupation authority's oppression" are probably a planetary majority at the moment, certainly in the developing world (except India).  But notice that when the Iraqi Prime Minister put out a statement in Arabic to that effect, after Oct. 7, he affirmed support for the PALESTINIAN cause, not Hamas. There was the perfect time to support Hamas, if it were worthy of that support. But the attack on Oct. 7, placed the gov. between Iraq and a hard place, so to speak, given it's desire for normal relations with the US and regional stability, and its difficulty managing disruptive Shia militia who DO openly support Hamas (one even invited a Hamas rep.to Iraq).  
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/iraq-crossroads-hamas-gaza-shia-militias/

Egypt's difficulty with Hamas is just common knowledge in the ME and among ME watchers. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/six-dilemmas-facing-egypt. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-israel-war-hamas-sisi/. Hamas support was at 4% a year ago.

You already know the Syrian gov. is Shia, and along with Iran and Hezbollah, part of the "Axis of Resistance" to Israel--a stance which, so far as I can tell, would be opposed by most Syrians, had they a say in the matter. Perhaps that, plus the disruption on the ground and conflict with the US following Oct. 7, account for the gov.'s reticence to go beyond rhetorical support for Hamas. https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-syria-is-so-silent-about-hamas/.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/10/syrias-al-assad-and-supporting-hamas-all-for-political-gain-or-optics

Hezbollah, Iran and Syria all appear surprised by Hamas' attack on Israel, which risked imposing a war on them they don't want, and increased factionalism amongst their constituencies. Their alliance commits them to voicing public support for Hamas, but they are doing as little as they can to back the rhetoric. So I am not taking their rhetoric as indicative of much more than damage control. Right now many in the Axis don't believe the reports of rape and violence against civilians, but as that changes, embarrassment rises. These horror stories so directly contradicted traditional warrior codes against harming civilians and rape. 

I could go into greater regional detail. The UAE (speaking of governments) hated Hamas long before the current war. At least a third of Saudis wanted to continue normalization with Israel even after Oct. 7. That's an indication of how the war has disrupted economic hopes of millions of Saudis, who support the Palestinian cause--but not Hamas. 

Finally: Perhaps helpful to add that I, like most in the ME, do not conflate Hamas and the Palestinians' cause, and so do not immediately interpret support for that cause as support for Hamas. I also recognize the considerable disjunct between rhetoric and action characteristic of some ME players, and take that as the starting point of inquiry rather than conclusive (and opportunistic) evidence of intent, as is frequently done by US News commentators from Fox's Hannity to MSNBC's Joe Scarborough. I don't always already "know" what Arabs/Muslims are like, bypassing contextual analysis to force self-confirming stereotypes onto every conflict. 

*It might require a separate post, but I could present recent evidence that while most Iranians support the PALESTINIAN cause, it's quite possible the majority are against their government's waste of resources on Hamas, whom they DO NOT support. This is one angle from which Hamas actions can further trouble the Iranian government, forced to continue endorsing Hamas for an agenda not supported by Iranians in general.