05-07-2017, 02:14 PM
The Russian military is a fraction of the size it was under the Soviets. The Army shrank from over 200 divisions to just 55 brigades. The Russian Navy and Air Force have had similar reductions. Part of that shrinkage was the loss of manpower from former Soviet Republics. The remainder was a concentrated draw-down to save money in the 90's.
But the Russians have deliberately kept their military small since that time and have elected to concentrate on improving quality and professionalism over increased numbers. These efforts have paid off. Their active duty forces are leaner and meaner than they have ever been and they have troops with recent combat experience from Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Their active forces are quite capable of fighting on equal terms with any similar sized Western force on a unit-by-unit basis.
The Russians have maintained division-level cadres of officers and equipment to rapidly mobilize the equivalent of up to roughly 100 divisions in the event of war. Those call-up units would be of lower quality than comparable Western reserves, however. Additionally, one problem that the modern Russian Army has is a lack of non-commissioned officers. They have an overage of commissioned officers (a situation which the Soviets never had as the communist system had disdain for the whole concept of officers). Commissioned officers are are often called upon to do jobs that would typically be NCO work in Western armies.It is a problem that the Russians are working to change.
The primary maneuver force for the Russians has changed from the division to the brigade. They have retained a handful of larger formations due to their historic legacies (such as the First Guards Tank Army), but they have been remade into smaller formations. The purpose in the reformation is to create units which can provide a more flexible and rapid response (commands to brigades come directly from the Kremlin through Theater-level commanders).
The Russian Air Force has reformed its command structure into base and air defense brigade groupings which directly support the Russian Army brigade system. They maintain an air fleet of approximately 3,000 aircraft. The numbers are lower than the former Soviet Air Force. However, they still maintain one of the largest air forces in the world (primarily to cover the vast Russian land mass). The Russians have concentrated on consistently updating their fighter, interceptor and attack aircraft during the past two decades and these aircraft are generally thought to be reasonably comparable to their Western counterparts. They maintain several hundred ancient strategic bombers, some of which have been adapted to carry cruise missiles. However, their usefulness in current Russian strategy is limited almost solely to being part of the country's nuclear deterrent.
The Russian Navy is a shell of its former self. The budget cuts of the 1990's hit the Navy more than any other service. It is estimated that the Russian Navy currently consists of 56 major and minor surface combatant ships and 63 submarines. Of those numbers, only about 60% are thought to be operational. In 2012, Vladimir Putin announced plans to build an additional 51 surface combatants and 24 submarines by 2020. Western experts are skeptical of Russia's ability to accomplish this as the country's shipbuilding and repair capabilities have degraded so much during the past 25 years. The Russian Navy has four districts (Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern) with a fleet centered around each (Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Fleet, respectively). Their fleets, however, are a joke in comparison to U.S. fleets. For example our 7th Fleet in the Pacific is only one of our five numbered fleets and contains more ships, aircraft and personnel than the entire Russian Navy. With the current Russian strategic concentration on operations in the Eurasian sphere (see OP), it is highly doubtful that the Russians will challenge U.S. naval supremacy anytime within the next 50 years.
The Russian forces have been redesigned with flexibility and speed in mind to reflect the current modern trend of non-linear combat and the reduced likelihood of force-on-force conflict with a country able to field a larger force (i.e. they are not expecting to fight land battles with the U.S. or China in the near future). Modern Russian strategy has turned away from global force projection, instead concentrating only within Russia itself and countries they consider to be within the Eurasian sphere of influence (see OP). The current Russian force in Syria is about as far from home as you can expect to see Russian troops anymore.
The Russians have adopted a doctrine of multi-phase warfare similar to our concept of full-spectrum conflict. The first phase is deception and information warfare to mobilize support and demoralize the enemy. Next, special operations forces and intelligence agents are covertly used to undermine infrastructure and create paramilitary forces in the targeted area. When the situation appears ripe, conventional forces are utilized. A primary goal is to achieve such successful results in the first two phases that the conventional forces move in with little bloodshed or conflict. Failing that, the conventional forces will engage using joint services to cordon off the targeted area and to use precision strikes to disable command and control as well as air defenses. The final move is using overwhelming firepower to defeat any remaining opposition. The Russians have successfully used this strategy recently in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
The Russians have enough of a military to make invading Russia an unattractive prospect. Beyond nuclear weapons, they do not pose a military threat to the U.S. or Western Europe. They do, however, pose a severe threat for nations which border Russia and for those within the Eurasia sphere. And their efforts to infiltrate and create dissension in other nations (including the U.S.) have been wildly successful beyond Putin's dreams... meaning we can expect much more of this in the future.
But the Russians have deliberately kept their military small since that time and have elected to concentrate on improving quality and professionalism over increased numbers. These efforts have paid off. Their active duty forces are leaner and meaner than they have ever been and they have troops with recent combat experience from Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Their active forces are quite capable of fighting on equal terms with any similar sized Western force on a unit-by-unit basis.
The Russians have maintained division-level cadres of officers and equipment to rapidly mobilize the equivalent of up to roughly 100 divisions in the event of war. Those call-up units would be of lower quality than comparable Western reserves, however. Additionally, one problem that the modern Russian Army has is a lack of non-commissioned officers. They have an overage of commissioned officers (a situation which the Soviets never had as the communist system had disdain for the whole concept of officers). Commissioned officers are are often called upon to do jobs that would typically be NCO work in Western armies.It is a problem that the Russians are working to change.
The primary maneuver force for the Russians has changed from the division to the brigade. They have retained a handful of larger formations due to their historic legacies (such as the First Guards Tank Army), but they have been remade into smaller formations. The purpose in the reformation is to create units which can provide a more flexible and rapid response (commands to brigades come directly from the Kremlin through Theater-level commanders).
The Russian Air Force has reformed its command structure into base and air defense brigade groupings which directly support the Russian Army brigade system. They maintain an air fleet of approximately 3,000 aircraft. The numbers are lower than the former Soviet Air Force. However, they still maintain one of the largest air forces in the world (primarily to cover the vast Russian land mass). The Russians have concentrated on consistently updating their fighter, interceptor and attack aircraft during the past two decades and these aircraft are generally thought to be reasonably comparable to their Western counterparts. They maintain several hundred ancient strategic bombers, some of which have been adapted to carry cruise missiles. However, their usefulness in current Russian strategy is limited almost solely to being part of the country's nuclear deterrent.
The Russian Navy is a shell of its former self. The budget cuts of the 1990's hit the Navy more than any other service. It is estimated that the Russian Navy currently consists of 56 major and minor surface combatant ships and 63 submarines. Of those numbers, only about 60% are thought to be operational. In 2012, Vladimir Putin announced plans to build an additional 51 surface combatants and 24 submarines by 2020. Western experts are skeptical of Russia's ability to accomplish this as the country's shipbuilding and repair capabilities have degraded so much during the past 25 years. The Russian Navy has four districts (Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern) with a fleet centered around each (Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Fleet, respectively). Their fleets, however, are a joke in comparison to U.S. fleets. For example our 7th Fleet in the Pacific is only one of our five numbered fleets and contains more ships, aircraft and personnel than the entire Russian Navy. With the current Russian strategic concentration on operations in the Eurasian sphere (see OP), it is highly doubtful that the Russians will challenge U.S. naval supremacy anytime within the next 50 years.
The Russian forces have been redesigned with flexibility and speed in mind to reflect the current modern trend of non-linear combat and the reduced likelihood of force-on-force conflict with a country able to field a larger force (i.e. they are not expecting to fight land battles with the U.S. or China in the near future). Modern Russian strategy has turned away from global force projection, instead concentrating only within Russia itself and countries they consider to be within the Eurasian sphere of influence (see OP). The current Russian force in Syria is about as far from home as you can expect to see Russian troops anymore.
The Russians have adopted a doctrine of multi-phase warfare similar to our concept of full-spectrum conflict. The first phase is deception and information warfare to mobilize support and demoralize the enemy. Next, special operations forces and intelligence agents are covertly used to undermine infrastructure and create paramilitary forces in the targeted area. When the situation appears ripe, conventional forces are utilized. A primary goal is to achieve such successful results in the first two phases that the conventional forces move in with little bloodshed or conflict. Failing that, the conventional forces will engage using joint services to cordon off the targeted area and to use precision strikes to disable command and control as well as air defenses. The final move is using overwhelming firepower to defeat any remaining opposition. The Russians have successfully used this strategy recently in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
The Russians have enough of a military to make invading Russia an unattractive prospect. Beyond nuclear weapons, they do not pose a military threat to the U.S. or Western Europe. They do, however, pose a severe threat for nations which border Russia and for those within the Eurasia sphere. And their efforts to infiltrate and create dissension in other nations (including the U.S.) have been wildly successful beyond Putin's dreams... meaning we can expect much more of this in the future.
![[Image: 416686247_404249095282684_84217049823664...e=659A7198]](https://scontent.fphx1-2.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t39.30808-6/416686247_404249095282684_8421704982366424390_n.jpg?_nc_cat=102&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=3635dc&_nc_ohc=p8hMrwwk1IoAX8mnFLJ&_nc_ht=scontent.fphx1-2.fna&oh=00_AfBXs4gKHr4knFejO874dfV3zzLd_bq4GiUqHxGWFlwbug&oe=659A7198)
