Trump White House quietly issues report vindicating Obama regulations

[Belsnickel]

Chapter 1, which covers this primarily:

Quote:This chapter consists of two parts: (A) the accounting statement and (B) a report on regulatory impacts on State, local, and tribal governments, small business, and wages. Part A revises the benefit-cost estimates in last year’s Report by updating the estimates through the end of FY 2016 (September 30, 2016). As in previous Reports, this chapter uses a ten-year lookback. Estimates are based on the major regulations (for which the regulatory agency monetized both benefits and costs) that were reviewed by OMB from October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2016.8 For this reason, rules reviewed from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 (FY 2006) were included in the totals for the 2016 Report but are not included in this Report. A list of these FY 2006 rules can be found in Appendix B (see Table B-1). The removal of the seven FY 2006 rules from the ten-year window is accompanied by the addition of 16 FY 2016 rules.

As has been the practice for many years, all estimates presented in this chapter are agency estimates of benefits and costs, or minor modifications of agency information performed by OMB.9 This chapter also includes a discussion of major rules issued by independent regulatory agencies, although OMB does not review these rules under Executive Order 12866.10 This discussion is based solely on data provided by these agencies to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) under the Congressional Review Act.

In the past, we have adjusted estimates to 2001 dollars, the requested format in OMB Circular A-4. We also report most of the numbers in this chapter in 2015 dollars as well, in order to provide estimates that reflect the most recent annual GDP deflator.

Aggregating benefit and cost estimates of individual regulations may produce results that are neither precise nor complete, nor, in some cases, conceptually sound. Six points deserve emphasis.

1. Individual regulatory impact analyses vary in rigor and may rely on different assumptions, including baseline scenarios, methods (including models), data, and measures of welfare changes (including approximations thereof). Summing across estimates involves the aggregation of analytical results that, for reasons we describe below, are not comparable. As one example, some agencies provide information on the stream of effects whereas other agencies provide information at specific points in time. As another, all agencies draw on the existing economic literature for valuation of reductions in mortality and morbidity, but the technical literature has not converged on uniform figures, and consistent with the lack of uniformity in that literature, such valuations vary somewhat (though not dramatically) across agencies. Later in this document we provide additional discussion of the uncertainty inherent in quantifying the value of a statistical life. More generally, OMB continues to investigate possible inconsistencies and seeks to identify and to promote best practices.

2. For comparisons or aggregations to be meaningful, benefit and cost estimates should correctly account for all substantial effects of regulatory actions including implementation periods, some of which may not be reflected in the available data. In addition to unquantified benefits and costs, agency estimates reflect the uncertainties associated with the agency’s assumptions and other analytic choices.

3. As we have noted, it is not always possible to quantify or to monetize relevant benefits or costs of rules in light of limits in existing information. For purposes of policy, non-monetized benefits and costs may be important. Some regulations have significant non-quantified or non-monetized benefits (such as protection of privacy, human dignity, and equity) and costs that are relevant under governing statutes and that may serve as a key factor in an agency’s decision to promulgate a particular rule.

4. Prospective analysis may overestimate or underestimate both benefits and costs; retrospective analysis can be important as a corrective mechanism.11 The implementation of Executive Orders 13771 and 13777, especially given the continued primacy of Executive Order 12866, requires such analysis, with the goal of improving relevant regulations through modification, streamlining, expansion, or repeal. The aim of retrospective analysis is to understand and improve the accuracy of prospective analysis and to provide a basis for potentially modifying rules as a result of ex post evaluations. Rules should be written and designed to facilitate retrospective analysis of their effects, including consideration of the data that will be needed for future evaluation of the rules’ ex post costs and benefits.

5. The OMB Circular A-4 states that “those who bear the costs of regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are not the same people.”12 As such, agencies are encouraged to provide separate descriptions of distributive effects. For example, energy efficiency regulations tend to adversely affect lower-income consumers more than those who earn a higher income.13 If a regulation would disproportionately help or hurt particular groups of people, relevant law may require or authorize agencies to consider that fact. While analysis of these types of impacts is more limited, efforts to examine the distributive impacts of regulations is increasing. Additional analyses of this type could prove illuminating.14

6. The most fundamental purpose of an RIA is to inform policy options at the time a regulatory decision is being made; however, analytic approaches that serve this purpose may not readily lend themselves to aggregation. For example, suppose the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issues a regulation reducing the permissible exposure level (PEL) for some toxin. OSHA estimates regulatory benefits based on a projection that the affected industries will comply by changing their production processes to entirely avoid using inputs that contain the toxin. If OSHA subsequently revises the regulation and, at the time of the revision, the best available evidence shows that exposure to the toxin has not been entirely eliminated, the RIA for the new rule would appropriately calculate benefits or forgone benefits using the more recent exposure data, even though a multi-year sum of the estimated effects of OSHA rules would yield an inaccurate cumulative total as a result. For example, if the new rule further reduces the PEL, some health and longevity benefits that were already tallied in the first rule would be double counted in an aggregation of the second rule’s RIA with the first rule’s. Analogously, if the new rule increases the PEL, forgone benefits would be substantially overestimated if the original RIA’s projection of zero exposure were carried forward into the new RIA in spite of the more recent empirical evidence.

There is a ton more in the document (these are pages 5-9 and don't include the footnotes). The tl;dr version is that these estimates are primarily provided by the agencies to OMB, which is then compiled in this report. There are some adjustments made in analysis by OMB, but that is only a small portion of what is presented.

These ranges reflect only the costs and benefits that can actually be quantified. Those that cannot be quantified are not included.

Now, analyses like this are always going to be based on a range because analysts, as much as we like to think we can, cannot predict the future. These ranges are based on statistical modelling and will have a margin of error and a confidence level attached to them. The range is likely so large because that is what puts them in the 95% confidence level, which is typically the standard. What this means is that the in 95% of the scenarios they could run, the costs and benefits will fall within those ranges. Yes, there is [generally] wiggle room in there, but that is accounting for anomalies and outliers and what would actually happen has a slimmer than 5% chance of actually falling outside of those ranges.