The Serious Foreign Policy Thread--Bolton Cleans House

[Dill]

(03-14-2018, 10:19 PM)hollodero Wrote: @topic I know that could become an annoying pet subject of mine, but isn't it strange that Russia used a nerve agent that could clearly and unambiguously be traced back to them? Why is there no attempt at secrecy. I think that's a question worth considering.

Chatham House as a useful take on the lack of secrecy:

The Skripal Attack Is a Test for the UK  https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/skripal-attack-test-uk#

In recent years, successive British governments have repeatedly communicated weakness to Russia without any intention of doing so.

First, even before the suspicious ‘suicide’ of dissident oligarch Boris Berezovsky in 2013, the UK authorities had been singularly lacklustre in prosecuting a macabre string of suspect deaths of Russian exiles on British soil. Until 2014, the government resisted a public inquiry into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, signalling that it was disinclined to name and shame Russia for fear of harming attempts to rebuild ties.

Second, Russia viewed the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 as an abdication of Britain’s great power role. The winding down of a fair portion of the UK’s maritime reconnaissance and warfare capability in northern waters was regarded with incredulity. The SDSR’s 2015 successor has repaired much of the damage to UK defence capacities, but this scarcely has registered in Moscow.

Third, David Cameron’s government chose to absent itself from the Russia–Ukraine ‘Minsk process’, leaving the running to Paris and Berlin. Given the UK’s prominent role in securing the rights and assurances that underpinned Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity (including its signature on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum), London effectively communicated to Moscow that Ukraine had become a lesser priority and that Britain had better things to do. Although the UK’s vigorous defence advisory effort has earned plaudits in Kyiv, Russia no longer considers Britain to be a serious player in Ukraine.

Fourth, there is Brexit, which many of its supporters believe will strengthen Britain’s global influence. Whatever the merits of that claim, the Russians view Brexit as a case of the UK cutting off its nose to spite its face. From the earliest days of the Cold War, the USSR and its Russian successor viewed Britain as Washington’s number one proxy in Europe. From Moscow’s perspective, the UK’s position at the EU top table enhanced US and British influence simultaneously. That advantage has been thrown away.

Today’s Russian leadership, political and military, believes it is at war with the West. It is not a war dominated by artillery and tanks, but by finance and social media, with huge opportunities for covert action from disinformation to assassination. As Russia’s Ministry of Defence stated in 2011, to prevail in these new conditions requires ‘destabilizing the society and state, and forcing the state to make decisions in the interests of the opposing party. That is the test the UK faces.

The last bolded point seems spot on.