SCOTUS rules on Travel Ban

[Dill]

(06-28-2018, 12:42 AM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: False equivalency as the travel ban is not interning anyone nor confiscating their property.  You enjoy the analogy because it is an extreme one that you think lends weight to your argument.  To us rational folks we view it as the extreme attempt to equate a travel ban with the forcible internment and property theft of a specific ethnic group.  It's a fail analogy and few are buying into it outside the liberal bubble..

Being "outside the liberal bubble" was not a good place to be in 1944, and I don't think it is now.

Deploying a circular definition of rationality doesn't establish any points you are trying to make, and least of all your own "rationality." Why not just stick to the legal issues and leave imputation of motives aside?

Whence comes "extremist" labeling of my post? Also circular? I clarified some points of the SCOTUS decision on Trump vs Hawaii based upon an existing structural analogy between all types of illegal discrimination.  "Forcible internment" and "property theft" are not the basis of the dissent, nor of the structural analogy I discussed, hence not the basis of some "false equivalency" or"failed analogy" made by me or the dissenting justices.  The dissent is based upon 1) a reading of the Establishment Clause, and 2) and a challenge to the majority's application of the "rational basis scrutiny."  The analogy to Korematsu was in the Government's failure of due diligence in representing a supposed threat to national security and the animus behind it.  The question of whether the analogy is valid is a question of whether animus and misrepresentation can be found in the process of developing Trump's Proclamation No. 9645.

(06-28-2018, 12:42 AM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: Sure.  Except in your analogy we're talking about all women.  Since the travel ban affects a minute percentage of the world's muslim population you cannot make a logical argument that the travel ban is a muslim ban.  If the intent of the ban is to exclude muslims, then it's doing a horrible job if it.  Can you think of no plausible reason for a travel ban from the listed countries other than islamic faith?  I'm willing to bet you could.

If my hypothetical law were address only to, say hairdressers or secretaries, then it would not include all women, yet still discriminate against women. One could not argue that it was not discriminatory because it did a "bad job" of including all women. In any case, "all" is not the test of discrimination in law, or one could argue that race played no role in Korematsu because it only affected a small proportion of Asians in the U.S.

Recognizing this, the dissent reminds the court of how, in cases involving the Establishment Clause, considering a history of animus in construction of a law is already "settled law."  Trump promised a Muslim ban, complained that the current executive order has been "watered down," and insisted that he is nevertheless keeping his campaign process. Roberts et al. dismissed that as a concern. To agree with Roberts is to take at face value Trump administration claims the travel ban suddenly has nothing to do with religion because they say it doesn't.

(06-28-2018, 12:42 AM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: Sure, he could.  Except he did not.  The dissenting opinion is just that, the minority opinion.  Sotomoyar can make whatever claim she wants, her opinion is the minority one, which in the SCOTUS, does not carry legal weight.  If the travel ban is later determined to be unconstitutional then we'll revisit this conversation.  As of now it hasn't, thus we needn't.

Or it could be state sponsors of terrorism or countries unable to adequately vet visa applicants.  Does it include all such countries?  No, I don't believe so.  That doesn't change the fact that the countries on the list can logically be described as such.

Some astonishing comments here.  The dissenting justices in Korematsu, who also made "whatever claim they wanted," would now find those claims embraced by the majority and minority in Trump vs Hawaii--except their reminder that presidential authority should not be beyond scrutiny, even in matters of national security.  Their minority dissent carried enough legal weight to become a basis for overruling Korematsu.

Could be. And it could be that existing restrictions on travel from the countries in question already manage that problem. Breyer's dissent points to the only effective change in travel policy from the targeted countries--namely that the number of visas granted to people who meet the Proclamations own criteria of legitimate entry have dropped dramatically. His anecdote about the deathly sick Yemeni girl denied a visa--until the matter became public--is telling. So, in effect, and as the Amici filled in dissent make clear, Muslims are being banned.  Not really the case with North Korea, because restrictions already in place meant few if any North Koreans traveled to the U.S. before 9645.  Little change there.

One cannot establish directly from the fact that countries on the travel ban list can be "logically described" as threats to national security that  Trump's travel ban is therefore not primarily about religious animus--especially if one dismisses evidence of the both the development and practice of the ban.