ISIS Defeated?

[Dill]

(01-18-2019, 02:43 PM)Au165 Wrote: The taliban was never gone. It had dwindled but it was NEVER gone. Which is my point it’s like cancer, it wasn’t cured only in remission. I stand by what I said we cannot defeat a foreign born organization inside their country. We can move them into remission but unless we plan to occupy every place indefinitely then it cannot be done. The ideology behind these organizations are deeply rooted in their own cultures and way off life in many cases. Guns and bombs can push it into hiding but it’s an ideology your really fighting.

"NEVER gone" might not be a realistic standard, if that means we have only won if there are no remaining stragglers.  The leadership and remaining fighters of the Taliban were driven to Pakistan in 2002, with stories of debilitating shock and awe. The US had done what the Soviets could not.  

That was not a victory for them, nor was it a tie. It was the defeat of the Taliban, in their own country, which they still do not hold. 

"Remission" in this case would be perfectly acceptable. And a win.

Your post gives me chance to articulate two important points with respect to AFGHANISTAN as apposed to Iraq, Syria, or Yemen.

 I. It is not an "ideology" which draws most Afghans to the Taliban, so it is a mistake to "fight ideology" there--except in the case of two transplants taking advantage of a broken state, and which have no real national appeal to Afghans.

A. The Deobandi ideology of Taliban leaders is not "rooted in Afghanistan" but from India and their beliefs are hardly shared by the rank and file.  The Darul Uloom Deoband in India is the only Islamic school I am aware of that supports the Taliban's interpretation of Islam. The only thing truly "organic" about Taliban ideology is the Pashtu code's defense of homeland from foreign invaders.

B. The Taliban have never been some uniform, ideologically cohesive military force. They are diverse groups who pledge personal loyalty to individual tribal leaders with very local support and interests, and who can be peeled away from the core group, and even folded into the government as has happened to other insurgents like Hekmatyr. Since 2013, they have separated into three different groups with three different leaders, one (under Mullah Niyazi) reportedly talking to Kabul now. It is not even clear which Taliban are really Taliban, and not simply other groups which have thrown in with them for temporary advantages but consider themselves a distinct political group.

C. On top of that the Taliban are primarily Pashtu and the rest of Afghanistan, some 53%, are not and are unwilling to live under raw Pashtu rule, especially one based on Deobandi.  If we don't bomb their weddings and kill their relatives, the majority of Afghans, including many Pashtu, will happily fight the Taliban rather than the US. When in power they could never gain full control or support of the country, and if the US left right now, it is doubtful the Taliban could retake Kabul.

II. As I stated above, the rise of the Taliban was--and continues to be--a response to insecurity. Many in the group were always ready to ditch them for something better.  Still are.  

A. On the white board, at least, it is simple: increase insecurity and you increase Taliban recruitment and create space for ISIS and Al Qaeda. Increase security, and you not only decrease recruitment but increase local will to resist the Taliban. 

B.  Off the white board, there is the problem of tribal mentality, which makes it difficult to train security forces which think in national rather than tribal terms, and there is a literacy problem, which makes it hard to train people at all. People raised in tribal/village culture are often difficult to integrate in to modern police/military organization. (Probably Bfine could back me up on this with personal observation.) These are the problems which we are addressing, but on a rather small scale compared to energy still devoted to kinetic military action.

C. There is also the problem of the US's military mentality and penchant for kinetic action, plus the acquiescence in warlordism in lieu of serious nation-building, which drive up the insecurity which drives up Taliban recruitment.  These are issues the US could address (Petraeus recognized the problem in part, trying to reduce the overuse of force), in part by reducing its military footprint in favor of programs which, for example, help farmers and build roads.  Most communities will also defend schools if a central government can provide and staff them.
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The ultimate goal here should not be to eradicate the Taliban. That is not what defines a "win."  A stunted Taliban, interested in controlling lpockets of territory on Paki border rather than attacking the US, is to me an acceptable outcome, even it perpetually wars with Kabul.

The goal is to create conditions in which foreign groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda cannot take root and thrive. If that is achieved, then that is a win and the blood spent was worth it.  And that goal is achievable if we stop supposing we have to defeat an "ideology" and instead make sure the majority of Afghan farmers, who have NO interest in carrying Jihad to the US, can produce and get their crops to market.