If Nobody Knows Your Iran Policy, Does It Even Exist?

[Dill]

(05-07-2019, 11:08 AM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: Dill Wrote: That seems to be the point of expanding the notion of "national interests" to "American interests in the region, including our allies interests."

There is literally nothing new about this concept, it's been the norm since the Kennedy administration.

Quote:The pretext for military action has suddenly been expanded, and not limited to Iran.

You'll have to expand on this point a bit.

It certainly wouldn't be the first time.  As for an Israeli strike bringing on a US response, it would be very situationally dependent.  In any event I fall back on my previous point, that being Venezuela is a far greater concern at the moment.  You oust Maduro and you eliminate a Chinese and Russian toehold in the Western hemisphere.  

Last point first. I was not suggesting an Israeli strike might bring on a US response, rather pointing out the US appears to be preparing to do what Israel has done, perhaps standing in for Israel.  

I will try to respond to the previous two points at once--first with an overview of what has passed for "normal" in US ME policy, and then expanding on Trump/Bolton's "expanded pretext" for military action as a contrast, a "new normal" so to speak.

At the most general level, administrations all sound rather the same: their foreign policies would promote peace and protect democracy, defend the homeland and US interests. Add support for Israel and you have, at its most general level, every administration's Middle East policy since Nixon.

But the devil is in the details, especially in how "National interest" and those of our allies, are defined as vital or secondary . E.g., in the 50s, the "Eisenhower Doctrine" justified military aid to Arab Muslim nations to check Soviet influence. In practice his FP criss-crossed alliances, backing Britain in the coup against Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, but backing Egypt against Britain and France during the 1956 Suez crisis, then backing the Maronite Lebanese president against Egypt in the 1958 Lebanon crisis.  Defending U.S. interests did not include permanent bases anywhere but Turkey (Incirlik). Israel and Egypt were not getting billions in yearly aid.  US carriers were not continuously present in the Mediterranean, Gulf or Red Sea.

Fast forward to the end of the Cold War, past Bush I to Clinton. In 1999, Egypt and Israel together are sucking down 5 billion in aid per year. The US has a massive airbase in Qatar, a naval port in Bahrain, and some 30,000 troops on three bases in Kuwait. The FP focus is on containing Iraq and preventing Iran from getting WMDs via sanctions. Military action is still for the most part second to diplomacy.  The only kinetic actions-- are a strike against Sudan and US planes empowered to engage targets between 1991-2003 in the Iraqi northern and southern no-fly zones, though Clinton's FP goals still prioritize diplomacy.  Were problems to flare up in Syria or Yemen or Qatar--even with Iran--diplomacy would come first.

On Obama's watch, the goal was to disentangle from the ME and pivot to Asia. Though a stable Iraq was in our national interest, there was great reluctance to re-intervene there, or to meddle in Syria. (Hence the readiness to accept Putin's proposal to rid the county of chemical weapons rather than missile strikes.)  There was a rear guard effort to keep Saleh in power in Yemen with aid and drones. Not a vital interest. The Iran Deal was designed to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions with the carrot of economic prosperity rather than the stick of military force. There was no general policy for application of "unrelenting force" as a first option anywhere.

But the Trump/Bolton Iran policy now empowers a range of US forces to intervene directly in a number of countries where they suspect Iranian action. The job of the carrier force is "to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force."  Not diplomacy. The language is analogous to that used in creating the above-mentioned no-fly zones in Iraq, only expanded now to cover most of the Middle East, with US forces poised to strike in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Gaza, the Gulf, and Iran itself. "'... if those actions take place, if they do by some third-party proxy, a Shiite militia group, the Houthis or Hezbollah, we will hold the Iranian leadership directly accountable for that,' said Pompeo."

This policy appears to be in the process of 1) redefining national interest such that a rocket attack on Israel from Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza, or could be met with "unrelenting US force" against the latter and/or Iran. And 2) devolving the power to engage from theater to operational level, so that commanders themselves can decide if and when to strike.

It is thus, at once, expanding the geographic scope of potential engagement while lowering the legal/political/diplomatic bar for it. So far as I am aware, this resolution to address a wide variety of threats to Israel and Saudi interests with immediate military response normally expected of their own military has never existed before--even during the 1st Fulf War.

(PS: I guess it's ok if we meddle in others elections while complaining when others meddle in ours, but I don't find it plain that interfering in Venezuelan elections is a priority, given the mass of manpower and treasure current directed to the ME.)