Gun owner poll

[Dill]

(10-04-2019, 02:35 AM)Bengalzona Wrote: One of the more popular tactics at the time (particularly championed by Custer) was to feint an attack in one direction and have another group swiftly ride into the Native encampment, seize the women and children (large native assemblies almost always brought their women and children with them), and hold them hostage until the Native leaders negotiated and dispersed. And this tactic was popular because it almost always worked. One of the reasons it worked was because it was used against different tribes at different times scattered across the West.

The Battle of Little Bighorn was different, however. The size of the Native assembly was far, far larger than anything they had ever seen. Custer knew it was large. Archeologists and historians now believe that he not only planned for the initial feint, but also included two other feint attacks by the troops with him as he rode the ridge. But it is doubtful that he realized exactly how large the assembly was. It is pretty clear from the battlefield remains that he felt he could find some place to turn left, cross the river and move into the camp. There was no place. I suspect the Natives got wind of the cavalry tactics and did something they normally didn't do, divided their forces. In any event, as Custer and his troops rode the ridge line north looking for a place to cross, Native warriors followed and were able to assemble in force each time to cavalry tried to feint or cross.

A couple more notes.

1. I always keep in mind that Custer was part of a three-pronged advance, with Gibbon to the West on the Yellowstone, Crook to the south of the Sioux and Cheyenne encampment and Terry coming from the East, moving along the Bighorn River.  Custer was with Terry, before separating with less than 700 men, turning south and then west towards the Little Bighorn, where he was to wait for the other columns. Crook had a least 1,000 men, but was turned back on June 17 at the battle of the Rosebud. Forward deployed Crow and Shoshone saved his command from an early morning ambush that day. New tactics: the Sioux and Cheyenne did not hit and run. Rather they kept up a sustained battle, with Crazy horse leading charges, retreating, and wheeling to charge from different angels.  6 hour fight.

2.  Custer had heard the hostiles were "many many", but it's doubtful he had a clue of the real size of the village, which could muster possibly 3,000 mounted warriors. There is no doubt he separated his command into three parts, with Reno and Benteen taking their forces south to attack the village from the southern end, leaving Custer with the main force to attack what would be the center. Reno rode down from the eastern bluffs above the LBH and formed a skirmish line in the flat woody lands across the river just south of the village, but his men were quickly over whelmed and, with Benteen, beat a retreat across the Bighorn, back up to the hilltop which is not the site of the Reno-Benteen battle. There they shot their horses, dug in, and held out for two days. Almost 350+ men, a hundred more than Custer. 

3. Looks like Custer, as you say, was riding along the ridge above the East side of the river, and rode down to the LBH at Medicine Tail Coulee, but never crossed the river, given the numbers of Sioux swarming out of the village and returning from the Reno engagement. I have been over this area on horseback, marked by clusters of white crosses planted where soldiers were originally buried. Looks like Custer's men were ridden down in a fighting, uphill retreat to "Last Stand Hill," with groups straggling and overwhelmed from below and the sides. Two here, six there, 8 on the other side of the ravine, strung out over 50 yards. There are about 40 crosses at the top of the hill where Custer fell. Another 15 or so scattered down the east side of the hill. All manner of speculation about the final moments, from an overwhelming charge to a shoot out with dwindling firepower on one side.  Nothing like Reno hill where you can still see how defense comprised rectangular fire pits spaced and organized around a central command and operating field hospital. The big mystery still is, why didn't he wait? Was there some tactical urgency he sensed, and so proceeded on bad intel, or was he thinking about his promising political future?

4. Final note: there is a ranch farther west, across interstate 90, where archeologists have discovered still another engagement, which may have included 20-30 dismounted cavalry. This would have been mile or so from the river. No clue how that was related to the battle. I only know about it because I used to do ranch work there back in the 60s and knew the rancher, a guy named Zettle.  Two small hills face one another. In the north front of the southernmost they found bullets from various repeat-fire carbines and 45-70 casings. In the south front of the northern hill they found dozens of 45-70 slugs.