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[Bengalzona]

(10-04-2019, 05:05 PM)Dill Wrote: A couple more notes.

1. I always keep in mind that Custer was part of a three-pronged advance, with Gibbon to the West on the Yellowstone, Crook to the south of the Sioux and Cheyenne encampment and Terry coming from the East, moving along the Bighorn River.  Custer was with Terry, before separating with less than 700 men, turning south and then west towards the Little Bighorn, where he was to wait for the other columns. Crook had a least 1,000 men, but was turned back on June 17 at the battle of the Rosebud. Forward deployed Crow and Shoshone saved his command from an early morning ambush that day. New tactics: the Sioux and Cheyenne did not hit and run. Rather they kept up a sustained battle, with Crazy horse leading charges, retreating, and wheeling to charge from different angels.  6 hour fight.

2.  Custer had heard the hostiles were "many many", but it's doubtful he had a clue of the real size of the village, which could muster possibly 3,000 mounted warriors. There is no doubt he separated his command into three parts, with Reno and Benteen taking their forces south to attack the village from the southern end, leaving Custer with the main force to attack what would be the center. Reno rode down from the eastern bluffs above the LBH and formed a skirmish line in the flat woody lands across the river just south of the village, but his men were quickly over whelmed and, with Benteen, beat a retreat across the Bighorn, back up to the hilltop which is not the site of the Reno-Benteen battle. There they shot their horses, dug in, and held out for two days. Almost 350+ men, a hundred more than Custer. 

3. Looks like Custer, as you say, was riding along the ridge above the East side of the river, and rode down to the LBH at Medicine Tail Coulee, but never crossed the river, given the numbers of Sioux swarming out of the village and returning from the Reno engagement. I have been over this area on horseback, marked by clusters of white crosses planted where soldiers were originally buried. Looks like Custer's men were ridden down in a fighting, uphill retreat to "Last Stand Hill," with groups straggling and overwhelmed from below and the sides. Two here, six there, 8 on the other side of the ravine, strung out over 50 yards. There are about 40 crosses at the top of the hill where Custer fell. Another 15 or so scattered down the east side of the hill. All manner of speculation about the final moments, from an overwhelming charge to a shoot out with dwindling firepower on one side.  Nothing like Reno hill where you can still see how defense comprised rectangular fire pits spaced and organized around a central command and operating field hospital. The big mystery still is, why didn't he wait? Was there some tactical urgency he sensed, and so proceeded on bad intel, or was he thinking about his promising political future?

4. Final note: there is a ranch farther west, across interstate 90, where archeologists have discovered still another engagement, which may have included 20-30 dismounted cavalry. This would have been mile or so from the river. No clue how that was related to the battle. I only know about it because I used to do ranch work there back in the 60s and knew the rancher, a guy named Zettle.  Two small hills face one another. In the north front of the southernmost they found bullets from various repeat-fire carbines and 45-70 casings. In the south front of the northern hill they found dozens of 45-70 slugs.

After the disaster, there were a lot of officers who were quick to hop on the "impetuous Custer" bandwagon and claim he should have waited for Terry or others. That is sort of Monday morning quarterbacking (with a bit of 'cover your ass' thrown in). The simple truth is, Custer's tactics were commonly used by a lot of officers at that time and you probably could have substituted any of them in his place and had the same result. Whether it was written or confirmed, he almost certainly had Terry's approval for independent  action. They knew who Custer was and how he went about his business. And they approved of it because he got things done.

On approaching the encampment, Custer split his regiment into three groups. Major Reno was given three companies and was ordered to move into the valley from the south. Captain Benteen was given three companies and held as a reserve. Custer took five companies with him and headed up the ridge line to the east of the river/camp.

Reno moved on the village in a skirmish line from the south and started firing into it around 3:00PM. The Native warriors charged out of the teepees piecemeal and started to swarm. At some point Reno realized from the size of the reaction that they were endanger of being overrun and ordered the men to fall back. They stopped and tried to stand at the bend in the river, but the Natives started to flank them. He ordered the men to retreat. Rather than an orderly retreat, chaos erupted and they fled helter skelter, losing a lot of soldiers in the process.

They fled south until they came to the hill now named for Reno. On the hill, they ran into Benteen and his forces. Benteen had received a dispatch from Custer to move forward to the bluff and support his attack. When Benteen saw the situation with Reno and his men, they dismounted there, rallied Reno's troops and set up a defensive perimeter. The position was repeatedly attacked by Natives. Except for an unsuccessful effort By Captain Weir and his company to move towards Custers position, the group remained pinned down from Native attacks until the next day.

Of Custer, the only things that are known for sure are when he moved out up the bluffs, that there was gunfire heard from the vicinity between 4:30 and 5:30, and where he and his men fell. He probably tried to find a good place to cross the river. Because of the escarpment on the east side (I'm sure you are familiar with), there are only three or four places where you could lead horses down heading west. They found shells at each and speculate that he sent troops down each to attempt feints and, finally, to try to attack at the last one. Also, as you mentioned, they eventually moved northeast to the hill where most of the bodies were found, apparently trying to assemble a defensive position similar to Reno/Benteen's. Obviously, they didn't have enough time.



Custer's final resting spot is about three and a half miles north of the Reno position. Considering that the Native attack on the Reno position was continuous and kept the from making attempts to reach Custer's position and the distances involved, the Natives would have had to have been split into at least two groups. Undoubtedly, there was some transfer of warriors back and forth from each site, but the firefights appear to have been going on at the same time (4:30 to 5:30). If Benteen had followed Custer's final order and tried to reach Custer, I think it is likely the entire regiment would have been destroyed piecemeal, considering the timing involved. He made the right choice.

The shells found west of I-90 are an interesting twist. Twenty to thirty troopers probably would have been a scouting group, possibly even Native scouts. Or, perhaps, maybe it was Natives from the battle trying out new weapons they had acquired after the fighting.