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I know I've said it before, but I was always a closet dork before the wreck and used to love to read and things. I've stated how I loved wars, the history of wars, tactics, and things of that sort.
Also, I know I mentioned it before, but if Hitler hadn't broken his treaty and invaded Russia, I think they win the war.
The reasons that he lost the war go beyond that, though, and they all stem from him basically losing his mind and not trusting anyone.
If he would have listened to his generals more, let them control things, and just stayed the track with what was working, I believe that the Germans could have conquered a lot more and ruled most of the world. I believe that he could have even eventually taken over Russia, but they just needed to invade during the warmer times of the year, which was the plan and they initially did, but things got held up and they ended up stuck in Russia for the winter with no winter clothes or supplies.
I do have troubles seeing how they could have invaded the United States, but with so much power and us fighting Japan on the other side of the world, I guess anything is possible.
Having no luck in enticing England to join in a fight against the USSR Hitler had to look for other, less powerful countries. Italy was the natural choice having an ideology similar to his but when WWII started their military equipment was already outdated. Other countries like Romania and Hungary were enticed in the Axis but neither could provide high quality military assistance.
That one could have made life easier on Hitler and made up for his mistakes, but ultimately don't stand out as a big reason why he lost because he didn't trust many people anyways and wanted to rule everything by himself.
Quote:9 The Not One Step Back policy
Hitler saved the German army from catastrophic defeat in the winter of 1941 – 1942 when he ordered his troops to stand and fight the Russian counter attacks after the failed operation to capture Moscow. At that point, a decision to withdraw could well have caused a total collapse of the German front and early defeat in Russia.
After this, feeling vindicated, he took his policy too far and allowed not a single unit to withdraw, sometimes meddling down to regimental and even company level.
His decision to deny the German 6th Army at Stalingrad to withdraw caused it’s total defeat and in later battles or to deny withdrawing to more favorable terrain or to shorten the line caused the German Army countless casualties that it could ill afford.
Another fault related to Russia, which he still could have been ok if he had just let them withdrawal completely after the initial decision to hold their ground.
Quote:8 The right technology used incorrectly
The Germans were well in advance of the Allies when it came to Military Technology. Vastly superior tanks and jet airplanes, mass produced and employed should have given the Germans an edge in any battle. However the quest for ever heavier tanks in stead of concentrating on mass production left the Germans with a wide array of tanks requiring different spares.
Also the reliance on forced labor meant that quality control was a big issue, causing more frequent breakdowns which required more spares etc.
This one I won't even pretend to understand because the Germans were successful in the beginning and so dominant because of the speed of blitzkrieg, so why would they want to do anything else?
Quote:7 Declaring War on the USA
On December 11, 1941, Germany declared war upon the United States, in response to what was claimed to be a series of provocations by the United States government when the US was formally neutral during World War II. This was 4 days after December 7, 1941 when the Empire of Japan launched an attack on Pearl Harbor.
According to the terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany was obliged to come to the aid of Japan if a third country attacked Japan, but not if Japan attacked a third country. Nevertheless, the German government chose to declare war on the United States.
This proved to be a godsend for both Churchill and Roosevelt who soon agreed on a Germany First strategy.
Another stupid move because why would you awake a sleeping giant before you even needed to? He didn't plan on invading the United States, but thought that they might be able to long after he was gone, so why even bring us into it?
Quote:6. Hitler taking over as Commander-in-Chief
In December 1941 when the attack on Moscow stalled and the Soviets launched a massive counter attack which threatened to rout the Germans.
Hitler did not wish to accept this and he began removing officers from their command. Hitler clearly did not believe in giving back captured territory (see reason 9), so in the biggest shake-up of all, he declared himself commander in chief of the army. He would train it “in a National Socialist way”—that is, by personal fiat. He would compose the strategies and the officers would dance to his tune.
Like I said, he lost trust in his generals when he lost his mind and tried to do it all himself.
Quote:5. Hitler did not listen to his Generals
Having won spectacular victories early in the war under his supervision Hitler considered himself a military genius. However, especially when the tides were turned in war, Hitler blamed his Generals for not carrying out his orders fueling further mistrust, in the end he only listened to himself (see reasons 9 and 6).
For instance, his plan to launch the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, despite his Generals misgivings, caused Germany to lose valuable men and material making the job of the final defeat of Germany easier for the Allies.
See above.
Quote:4. The Russian Winter
Hitler was certain of a quick victory over the USSR, saying to his Generals “We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down”, there was no need to prepare for the Russian winter as by then Russia would be defeated. However, being unable to capture Moscow and force a surrender meant his troops had to face the full onslaught of arctic cold in their summer uniforms.
See above again about not being able to defeat Russia so quickly.
Quote:3. The attack on Greece
Fully aware of the urgency to launch their assault on the USSR right after the thaw ended and Russian roads became passable again Germany ended up bailing out Italy (see reason 10) in their misadventure in Greece.
This military operation, even though Greece was taken quickly and thereby the Southern flank of the attack on Russian was now firmly secured, caused a 6 week delay of the attack on Russia. This delay meant that 6 autumn rains and then winter arrived before Operation Barbarossa was completed and the Russians destroyed.
Another delay in the attack on Russia.
Quote:2. Battle of Stalingrad
One of the costliest battles ever fought in war, the Battle of Stalingrad became a turning point for the second world war. Driving for the oil fields in the Caucasus the German 6th Army could have bypassed the or surround the city to take care of it later. However they went in full force, but being forced to fight for every city block, house and room causing massive casualties.
Then the Russians an offensive and surrounded Stalingrad and destroyed the 6th Army, which was not allowed to pull back (see reason 9).
Once again, Hitler's arrogance and refusal to admit defeat caused his own destruction, which reminds me of some people I know.
Quote:1. A two front war
Luccaitaly1944American Soldiers in Italy [Via]
Hitlers prime target had always been Russia but to secure Germany’s western flank and avoid a war on two fronts Germany decided to attack France and Britain first. France was taken care off in a matter of weeks but having lost the Battle of Britain Hitler had only partially achieved securing his western flank. When he declared war on the USA (see reason 7) and had to fight Britain and the USA first in North Africa and then in Italy and later France Hitler was constantly dividing his forces.
Not being able to focus his full strength anywhere meant he could not force a decisive victory and ultimately invited defeat.
Basically the two front war killed the German army, which I don't understand because he could have focused on the East and conquered Britain in no time if he had used all his forces and then been able to turn back towards Russia, which still would have been stupid IMO, but it might have worked because they'd be fighting Britain all winter and then could attack Russia when it was warm again and might have been able to achieve victory before the freezing cold hit.
Anybody else interested in wars like I am or have any opinions on any of my ideas or thoughts of their own about everything?
#8 is only partly correct. When Hitler invade France, the allies actually had better tanks. Their problem was how they used them. The prevailing theory at the time was that tanks should be spread out among the infantry and used as support. The blitzkrieg was formulated with this in mind. Even though their tanks we're better armed and armored, there we're never enough of them in any one place to stop the concentrated German formations.
What I find ironic is that this is exactly what Patton did to the Germans only a few years later. While a single Sherman was no match for a Panther, let alone a Tiger, 4 or 5 Sherman's could overwhelm anything the Reich had in the field.
Simply stated, Germany lost because they didn't know when to stop.
There are many aspects I feel people overlook when listing German flaws in the war. Though I will put a few thoughts out there NONE of those over-ride that one simple point. Germany and Hitler didn't know when to stop. And yes, it is important to list both of those separately.
Quote:9 The Not One Step Back policy
This directly goes to what I stated but other than that, this is over-valued because it goes into the whole Russia thing (see below).
Quote:8 The right technology used incorrectly
Should actually be higher on the list. But a little more precise (and again tying into not knowing when to stop) the defensive tactics used by the Germans are the best examples of them being beaten by tactics over technology. But the biggest aspect is where they didn't utilize technology. The jets they designed would have given them air superiority which could have overcome the Allied tactics.
Quote:7 Declaring War on the USA
Though not quite a non-factor it is close to being one. Their reason for declaring war on the US was actually somewhat valid. The US was provoking both Germany and Japan. Japan even stated some of those tactics very directly in their declaration of war in form of support of China and cutting off supplies such as steel and fuel. And to tie both together covert involvement in the middle east.
The US would have eventual declared war on Germany to support Great Britain, the only question is when and why. Perhaps after eliminating Japan which would have happened faster if all the resources were directed at them. Think of the fact the US was winning in the Pacific even with most of their resources in Europe. In fact, perhaps the number 1 reason Germany lost (only when considering US involvement) is actually the Japanese declaration of war on the US.
Quote:1. A two front war
What people tend to ignore when pointing this out is Germany attacked Russia six months before Pearl harbor. Even this points back to my original point of not knowing when to stop but for additional info people seem to frequently forget -
The so called alliance Germany had with Russia was actually a non-aggression pact.
Stalin believed Germany would have attacked them after they beat the UK.
Russia was at war with Japan before all of this started. Again, Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Japan.
Those last 2 mean even if Germany didn't attack Russia, it isn't as if Russia would have taken an offensive position against the US, or if they lasted long enough the UK. And the UK, I believe, would have lasted long enough for the US to finally get involved.
Add to all that, the US, the UK and Russia knew how important resources were to Germany. The US and the UK were actively working in the middle east and if Germany would have beat the UK, Russia already knew the value of fuel and laid the ground-work to cut off Germany. Add to that, I think the US was actually the oil kings at that time.
But yeah, that isn't a bad list overall, it just ignores or underplays a few points. Even if the Germans would have made all the right moves on that top 10 (except air superiority through technology) they would have eventually lost because....
A rather generic, and broad, list and it ignores the most significant blunders of the war.
1. The pause in the encirclement favored by Guderian and Von Manstein that allowed the majority of the BEF to escape from Dunkirk. While some argue that the German army had reached its limit I stand by the expertise of the men above that the encirclement could have been completed and the BEF destroyed in it's entirety.
2. The diversion of Luftwaffe forces away from the destruction of RAF bases, facilities and production to the bombing of urban centers and other non-military targets. The RAF was at the point of exhaustion both in men and material, but a desire for atavistic vengeance gave them the reprieve they needed.
3. The constant shifting of objectives in the beginning of Barbarossa. Every German general worth his salt recognized Moscow as the prime objective of the initial invasion. Far beyond it's symbolic value as the capital of the USSR and the industrial value of it's nearby industry is the real reason for it's status as a must capture point. It was the rail, and thus logistical, hub for the entire USSR. Without Moscow the USSR was instantly cut apart into smaller, isolated, fiefdoms completely incapable of supporting or reinforcing each other in any way. The capture of Moscow, which very nearly happened anyways, was made impossible by Hitler's constant diversion of forces to far lesser targets. Quite simply, the Germans take Moscow and WW2 is unwinnable on the European continent for the allies.
4. Lastly, and the real end of any chance at a negotiated peace for the Germans, was Hitler's instance on the offensive, or forehand, at Kursk instead of the vastly favored counter attack, or backhand, proposed by Von Manstein. In choosing as he did Hitler sacrificed the main advantages his military held over the Soviets; maneuverability, competence at all levels of the chain of command (below Hitler), the training and discipline of the individual soldier and communications. He instead chose a brutal head on attack against a numerically superior enemy with defense in depth and thereby destroyed the ability of the Heer to ever engage in a major offensive action on the Eastern Front again.
(01-26-2016, 10:36 PM)BFritz21 Wrote: Also, I know I mentioned it before, but if Hitler hadn't broken his treaty and invaded Russia, I think they win the war.
The treaty was broke before it was even signed. Invading the Soviet Union was the whole point of the war: German "elbow room". And if Hitler didn't break it first (which he wasn't about to let that happen), then Stalin most assuredly would have. Both countries had invasion plans drawn against the other when Ribbentrop and Molotov made the agreement.
Quote:If he would have listened to his generals more, let them control things, and just stayed the track with what was working, I believe that the Germans could have conquered a lot more and ruled most of the world.
Hitler did listen to his generals. He just didn't always listen to the right ones, and in particular, at the right times. Most of Hitlers' time was spent meeting with commanders and reviewing situations and and their plans.
Case in point: Rommel. Rommel was one of Hitler's favorites. And he was a good 'tactical' leader. But Rommel was not good at strategic level thinking. He should have never been a corp or army level commander. He was pretty much universally disliked by his superiors and peers in the German High Command for his strategic incompetence.
Having no luck in enticing England to join in a fight against the USSR Hitler had to look for other, less powerful countries. Italy was the natural choice having an ideology similar to his but when WWII started their military equipment was already outdated. Other countries like Romania and Hungary were enticed in the Axis but neither could provide high quality military assistance.
Hitler's allies actually helped him as much as they hurt him.
The Wehrmacht was augmented by millions of volunteers from throughout Europe and the Middle East. Croatian volunteers filled 3 divisions. Spain supplied the "Blue Division". Between 800,000 and 1,000,000 emigres and defectors from the Soviet Union formed the Russian Liberation Army and the Hilfswillige. Even the SS drew tens of thousands of volunteers from other countries. The Wiking and Nordland SS divisions were two of the most famous and were created from volunteers in other northern European countries. These millions of volunteers were part of the German army.
The "outdated" equipment thing is overrated. Finnish troops, a pseudo-ally of Hitler's, stopped the Red Army in its tracks in 1939-40 with 'outdated' equipment. The fact is that over the course of the war, most equipment became 'outdated' at some point. The tanks that the Wehrmacht rolled over France with in 1940 were already outdated. Germany opened the invasion of France primarily with Panzer I's (lightly armored with only machine guns), Panzer II's (lightly armored with only a 20mm main gun), Panzer III's (reasonably armored, but undergunned with a 37mm main gun), and Panzer 35's and 38's (Czech tanks confiscated by the Germans with decent armor, but small main guns). None of the German tanks were a match for the French Renault R35 and Char B, which were heavily armored and had superior main guns (the Char B had a 75mm gun and a 47mm gun). They didn't have to be. The Germans relied upon their 88mm anti-tank guns, their artillery and the Luftwaffe to destroy the French tanks sent against them in a piecemeal fashion (as Mallorian69 mentioned, this was almost exactly the same way the Americans would take out most of the heavier German Panthers and Tigers in France later).
As for Italy, the problem with the Italians wasn't equipment. And it wasn't their soldiers. Their problem was leadership. In particular, their strategic leadership. Poor planning and execution was indicative of nearly every major Italian campaign. Mussolini, like Hitler and Stalin, was active in promoting which generals would lead his troops. But unlike those two, his selections were universally lousy.
But Italy served a greater purpose to Hitler and Germany: it kept the British, and later the Americans, tied up in North Africa and Southern Europe until 1944 with a reduced number of German troops invested. Of course, the Americans actually wanted to be 'tied up' there until they were prepared for D-Day (they could show Stalin they were doing 'something' in the West without having to take on the burden of invading France until they were ready... and until the Soviets had beat up the Germans pretty good). People think that the campaigns in Greece, North Africa and Italy kept huge amounts of German troops off the frontlines in the Soviet Union. It did keep some troops from there. But the numbers were not huge. Panzerarmee Afrika (a.k.a. the Afrika Corps) never had more than 3 or 4 under-strength and ill-supplied divisions. The invasion of Greece and the Balkans was conducted by Kleist's Panzer Group (9 divisions), which was then moved to the Russian front to fight at Kharkov (BTW- the main concern for the Germans in Greece and the Balkans was not that the British would be able to assemble and invade there. Britain was too weak for that and the U.S. had not entered the war yet. The main German concern was to prevent the British from building airfields there to attack the oil fields in Romania. The Americans would eventually do that from North Africa and Italy with long-range bombers anyway). Italy was defended by the 10th German Field Army (roughly 80,000 men at most). Now, this was a large number of troops, no doubt. But it is nothing compared to the half million men that Germany committed to defending Norway throughout the war.
The fact is, numbers of troops was not the problem for the Germans on the Eastern Front. They had sufficient troops to accomplish the invasion. The problem, as SSF noted, was the constant shifting of objectives on that front. Had they concentrated on Moscow over the South rather than vacillating, they probably would have seen better results.
Which brings us back to Germany's allies. The problem with the Romanian, Italian, Hungarian, etc. allied troops in Southern Russia is that they were over-extended to support the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The line was stretched too far for them to effectively defend. It was not so much a matter of out-dated equipment.
Any list of why the Nazis lost can't be complete without mentioning the resources and man power
Hitler had invested in wiping out the Jews.
Also, Hitler was a sadistic and psychotic drug addicted moron, which played a huge part in every decision he ever made. He really was not very bright. He falsely believed in the value of the Blitzkrieg which really only worked against people who were not able to defend themselves. As soon as the Nazis ran into someone who could, they were done.
And, really, the biggest reason of them all--no country can take over the world.
“Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I’m not sure about the universe.” ― Albert Einstein
t think they lost because Hitler refused to listen to anyo9ne who told him he was wrong. Instead of listening to all of them he developed paranoid delusions to explain how everyone else was wrong and he was the only one who could see the truth.
(01-27-2016, 02:13 AM)Sociopathicsteelerfan Wrote: 3. The constant shifting of objectives in the beginning of Barbarossa. Every German general worth his salt recognized Moscow as the prime objective of the initial invasion. Far beyond it's symbolic value as the capital of the USSR and the industrial value of it's nearby industry is the real reason for it's status as a must capture point. It was the rail, and thus logistical, hub for the entire USSR. Without Moscow the USSR was instantly cut apart into smaller, isolated, fiefdoms completely incapable of supporting or reinforcing each other in any way. The capture of Moscow, which very nearly happened anyways, was made impossible by Hitler's constant diversion of forces to far lesser targets. Quite simply, the Germans take Moscow and WW2 is unwinnable on the European continent for the allies.
Good point, but I disagree with your ultimate conclusion. Germany was just trying to take over too much area too quickly.
Just because a country captures enemy territory that does not mean it does not have to spend significant resources keeping that territory under control. It is easy to exploit captured territory for raw resources, but it is not easy to harness an enemy work force and make them manufacture goods to support the war effort.
The Germans were well in advance of the Allies when it came to Military Technology. Vastly superior tanks and jet airplanes, mass produced and employed should have given the Germans an edge in any battle. However the quest for ever heavier tanks in stead of concentrating on mass production left the Germans with a wide array of tanks requiring different spares.
Also the reliance on forced labor meant that quality control was a big issue, causing more frequent breakdowns which required more spares etc.
The statement that "The Germans were well in advance of the Allies when it came to Military Technology" is not exactly true.
A lot is made of the German "wonder weapons". Very few of their futuristic designs actually made it to the field. The notable exceptions were the Panther and Tiger tanks, the ME-262 jet fighter, the Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle, and the V-1 and V-2 rockets. German rocketry and jet propulsion technologies were certainly far more advanced than the allies.
However, the allies were no technological slouches. The U.S. brought nuclear technology to fruition, the ultimate gamechanger. Additionally, American attack aircraft and bombers were far more advanced than any other country. The B-29 was the penultimate strategic bomber of the war. The P-51 fighter was the best fighter of the war until the Germans fielded the 262. By 1943, American carrier-born aircraft were the most advanced in the world.
But the U.S. had bigger advantages than even these. Because they are not "weapons systems", people tend to ignore the two technologies which won the war for the U.S. and made the U.S. into the per-eminent superpower of the world: industrial technology and logistics. Our industrial tech and capacity isn't what it was during WWII. But at that time, there was no comparison between the U.S. and any other country. And logistics, in particular, is something that our armed forces have done better than any other country in the world for over a hundred years. Think about it. How many countries can you think of that can move a hundred thousand soldiers anywhere in the world within 6 to 8 weeks and keep them supplied there? The answer then, as it is now, is none. Just the U.S. We routinely moved this many troops through the Pacific and the Atlantic throughout the war. Our concentration on this began out of necessity during the Revolution when Washington assigned one of his best field generals, Nathaniel Greene, to be the Quartermaster for the Continental Army. That tradition has carried on since. We do the 'inglorious' background jobs that ultimately win conflicts better than anyone.
Britain also had military technologies they led during the war. Radar. Code-breaking. Espionage. It was Britain's aviation technology that made the P-51 the top fighter for as long as it was (Rolls Royce engine, bubble canopy, etc.).
Soviet military technology was vastly underrated. The reason the Germans developed the Panther and the Tiger tanks was because of the T-34, which was superior to any of the German tanks (Panzer III's and Mark IV's primarily) fielded at the onset of Barbarossa. And, unlike the French, the Soviets had a mobile warfare doctrine similar to the Germans to maximize the use of their tanks. Soviet tank development did not end with the T-34, either. From 1943 on, the Soviets would develop develop and field a range of tanks (T-43, KV-85, IS-2, IS -3 and IS-4) which could stand toe-to-toe with Panthers and Tigers and win (i.e. the Panthers and Tigers were only "the best" for a short period of time). During the Cold War, there were running jokes about the poor reliability of Soviet equipment. But during World War II, the opposite was true. The equipment they fielded was highly reliable, tough and generally able to serve in all weather conditions. This was a primary concern among the Red Army.
Generally in World War II, advances in individual weapon systems were short-lived as on-going development of new weapons by opposing nations rendered them out of date over time. It was a constant game of one-up-man ship. The new developments were driven by need and, in the case of the Germans, desperation. And no individual weapons system, outside of the atom bomb, was so dominant as to give a decisive edge for one side or the other, no matter how many they made. The lessons in World War II were more about strategies and combined arms rather than individual weapons.
(01-27-2016, 08:01 AM)Bengalzona Wrote: People think that the campaigns in Greece, North Africa and Italy kept huge amounts of German troops off the frontlines in the Soviet Union. It did keep some troops from there. But the numbers were not huge. Panzerarmee Afrika (a.k.a. the Afrika Corps) never had more than 3 or 4 under-strength and ill-supplied divisions. The invasion of Greece and the Balkans was conducted by Kleist's Panzer Group (9 divisions), which was then moved to the Russian front to fight at Kharkov (BTW- the main concern for the Germans in Greece and the Balkans was not that the British would be able to assemble and invade there. Britain was too weak for that and the U.S. had not entered the war yet. The main German concern was to prevent the British from building airfields there to attack the oil fields in Romania. The Americans would eventually do that from North Africa and Italy with long-range bombers anyway). Italy was defended by the 10th German Field Army (roughly 80,000 men at most). Now, this was a large number of troops, no doubt. But it is nothing compared to the half million men that Germany committed to defending Norway throughout the war.
The fact is, numbers of troops was not the problem for the Germans on the Eastern Front. They had sufficient troops to accomplish the invasion. The problem, as SSF noted, was the constant shifting of objectives on that front. Had they concentrated on Moscow over the South rather than vacillating, they probably would have seen better results.
Which brings us back to Germany's allies. The problem with the Romanian, Italian, Hungarian, etc. allied troops in Southern Russia is that they were over-extended to support the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The line was stretched too far for them to effectively defend. It was not so much a matter of out-dated equipment.
Moving large number of troops, weapons, and armor over long distances burned up resources that could be better used on the battlefield.
The military planning got worse and worse as Hitler lost his shit. But their biggest mistake was trying too take too much territory too fast. It wasn't like he was liberating the masses from oppressive leaders or uniting a group of people with some shared religious beliefs. So the citizens had no reason to support the invading forces. It takes lots of resources to occupy captured areas when they have no reason to support the invaders. In fact sometimes it can take more resources to hold the land than it did to overthrow its government with military force.
The soviets actually got us into the war which caused Germany to declare war subsequently. It was because they couldn't fight Germany and Japan on both sides. If Harry Dexter White isn't a soviet spy we never get into the war and Japan never attacks us.
Invaded Russia at least 12 months too early. Credit Churchill with this.
Didn't invade Great Britain and tried to bomb them into submission.
Didn't supply the IRA with the weapons that they asked for to fight.
Didn't supply the Arabs with planes, weapons and artillery to fight the allies. Only supplied old weapons and trainers, lol.
Declared war on the United States after the United States declared war on Japan. Although, Hitler was forced to do so since Japan was an ally.
Had no one in his inner circle to tell him "No".
Was a drug addict...Meth head...go figure
Sociopath
Narcissist
Evil
EDIT: Also, Germany's rail system wasn't the same as the the rest of the world. Their tracks were wider and to get men and supplies to the eastern front, they had to transfer it all to different trains.
Another EDIT: Germany had far supperior technology than the rest of the world. Their tanks were the best but they were difficult to build and the crews didn't know how to fix anything if the tank broke down. Technicians had to be called to fix the tank. Plus, when the United States pumped of Sherman's at a ratio of something like 25:1, Germany couldn't keep up.
One More EDIT: the United States sent their best pilots back home to train others while Germany left their best pilots on the front lines. Also, to save pilots lives when shot down, the fuel tanks of the aircraft had a bladder in them. Fumes didn't build up in the wings and when shot, the planes didn't explode like the enemies did. This could have been Japan as well, I may be getting the two confused.
Then there's Bletchly Park and the cracking of the Enigma Machine.
The development of radar. I think it was Japan but it could have been Germany, anyway, the Allies used radar to find incoming aircraft and were able to scramble fighters. This is how Great Britain won the Battle of Britain. The Germans were developing radar to use as a weapon, lol. Of course, this may have been Japan, I don't remember.
Song of Solomon 2:15
Take us the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vines: for our vines have tender grapes.
(01-27-2016, 10:59 PM)fredtoast Wrote: Moving large number of troops, weapons, and armor over long distances burned up resources that could be better used on the battlefield.
The military planning got worse and worse as Hitler lost his shit. But their biggest mistake was trying too take too much territory too fast. It wasn't like he was liberating the masses from oppressive leaders or uniting a group of people with some shared religious beliefs. So the citizens had no reason to support the invading forces. It takes lots of resources to occupy captured areas when they have no reason to support the invaders. In fact sometimes it can take more resources to hold the land than it did to overthrow its government with military force.
The Germans failure in the Soviet Union wasn't because they didn't have enough troops, weapons or armor. It was a matter of seizing key objectives deep within the country in a timely manner: Moscow (Army Group Center), Stalingrad (Army Group South) and Leningrad (Army Group North). Time was their enemy. The Germans were well aware that if they did not seize at least one of these key strategic points before the Soviets could fully mobilized and also shift troops from the eastern portion of the country, then they would face a growing wave troops weapons and armor that they could not hope to match regardless of whether they had moved the few divisions tying up British and later American forces in North Africa and Italy to Russia or not. And while they did not know specifically when their 'deadline' was for accomplishing this task, they had a good rough idea. The clock started ticking on Dec. 7, 1941.
The German High Command in 1941 was not so worried about the Americans entering the conflict. They knew it would take the Americans years to get to Western Europe. When Hitler declared war on the U.S. following Pearl Harbor, it was so that his submarine force could freely attack American shipping and transports and to make any American move across the Atlantic extremely costly. This almost occurred. What the High Command was most worried about was hordes of Soviet troops being sent west to engage the Germans from eastern Soviet Union. The Soviets had maintained several of their best armies in the east to protect against sudden attack from Japan.
The Soviets had a good reason to do this. In 1939, a force of 80,000 Japanese of the Kwantung Army invaded Soviet-controlled Mongolia from Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. At the Battle of Khalkin Gol, the Japanese force was enveloped and eliminated by a Soviet force led by a brilliant young general named Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov's pioneering use of massed armor and combined arms to defeat the Japanese in 1939 was little known in the West at that time and predated the same tactics that would become the German Blitzkrieg in 1940.
With the Japanese at war with the U.S., the Soviets no longer feared a Japanese attack in the east and freed those troops to move west to face the Germans. The time it took for those reinforcements to shift west was the time the Germans had to seize one or more of their primary objectives and consolidate their forces around it. Knowing that the Japanese would, at some point, go to war with the Americans, Hitler had hoped accomplish this before that eventuality happened. The Germans had petitioned the Japanese to delay attacking the Americans and attack the Soviets instead. But after the pasting they received from Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese were having none of that. Their attack on the U.S. was based upon their need for resources in southeast Asia to support their war effort in China (their offensive there had reached a standstill). They needed the Americans and the Europeans out of the region to grab those resources.
So, the Germans were under a tight deadline in their invasion of the Soviet Union. Because of this timeline, they needed to concentrate their main thrust on one of the three primary objectives. The thrusts towards the other objectives would still be necessary to protect the others' flanks. But obtaining those other objectives could wait.
The initial decision was that prime importance should be placed upon the drive for Moscow. This made good sense as Moscow was centrally located. There were not many wartime resources in the area. But it was the major national hub for roads and railroads throughout the country. With Moscow secured, the Germans would have a centralized point deep within the country to ship troops, supplied and munitions either north or south as needed. From there, they could support the taking of the next two objectives in order. Army Group Center would receive the most resources in their drive on Moscow. Army Group South was given second priority in their drive on Stalingrad. And Army Group North was given the third priority.
This plan initially went well. In the initial drive, Army Group Center was reportedly able to reach with about 40 miles of Moscow, despite worsening weather conditions, layers of Soviet field works, and Soviet counterattacks which slowed their advance. Army Group North was able to encircle Leningrad and was content to lay siege there until they were moved up on the priority list. Army Group South made great gains through the Ukraine. And this was the situation when Pearl Harbor took place. By that time, new campaigns in the Soviet Union would have to wait until late spring of 1942 due to weather conditions.
This was where the Germans changed their main objective. Rather than pursuing the drive on Moscow, they developed plans for a two pronged attack on the other objectives: Operation Nordlicht to seize Leningrad and Case Blue to seize the oil-rich Caucasus region and Stalingrad. Nordlicht was eventually cancelled due to a Soviet offensive in the area which was repelled. Case Blue went forward, initially to tremendous success. They took the Caucasus region, which Hitler coveted for the needed oil. But they had to seize Stalingrad to consolidate the gains and to serve as a logistics hub. They almost succeeded. But the Soviet defenders held out long enough for Zhukov and the eastern forces to arrive and encircle the German 6th Army in Operations Uranus and Little Saturn.
The forces were there for the Germans to accomplish what they set out to do. However, the timing and deployment undermined their goals.
(01-27-2016, 03:14 PM)fredtoast Wrote: Good point, but I disagree with your ultimate conclusion. Germany was just trying to take over too much area too quickly.
Just because a country captures enemy territory that does not mean it does not have to spend significant resources keeping that territory under control. It is easy to exploit captured territory for raw resources, but it is not easy to harness an enemy work force and make them manufacture goods to support the war effort.
An extremely fair point, controlling territory soaks up a ton of manpower. What can't be debated though is the fact that the red army tied up around 80% of German forces. Without the red army occupying such a large percentage of German forces, and especially allowing the Luftwaffe to concentrate solely on the western front, I don't see any way the allies establish a toehold in Europe to establish a major threat to the Germans. Occupying territory wouldn't require near the amount of forces that a thousands of mile front against a numerically superior opponent would. Lastly, I think if Moscow was taken the Russians morale would have gone to non-existent. Stalin himself was debating surrender prior to the potential taking of Moscow, he was panicked.
(01-28-2016, 01:04 AM)Bengalzona Wrote: The Germans failure in the Soviet Union wasn't because they didn't have enough troops, weapons or armor. It was a matter of seizing key objectives deep within the country in a timely manner: Moscow (Army Group Center), Stalingrad (Army Group South) and Leningrad (Army Group North). Time was their enemy. The Germans were well aware that if they did not seize at least one of these key strategic points before the Soviets could fully mobilized and also shift troops from the eastern portion of the country, then they would face a growing wave troops weapons and armor that they could not hope to match regardless of whether they had moved the few divisions tying up British and later American forces in North Africa and Italy to Russia or not. And while they did not know specifically when their 'deadline' was for accomplishing this task, they had a good rough idea. The clock started ticking on Dec. 7, 1941.
The German High Command in 1941 was not so worried about the Americans entering the conflict. They knew it would take the Americans years to get to Western Europe. When Hitler declared war on the U.S. following Pearl Harbor, it was so that his submarine force could freely attack American shipping and transports and to make any American move across the Atlantic extremely costly. This almost occurred. What the High Command was most worried about was hordes of Soviet troops being sent west to engage the Germans from eastern Soviet Union. The Soviets had maintained several of their best armies in the east to protect against sudden attack from Japan.
The Soviets had a good reason to do this. In 1939, a force of 80,000 Japanese of the Kwantung Army invaded Soviet-controlled Mongolia from Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. At the Battle of Khalkin Gol, the Japanese force was enveloped and eliminated by a Soviet force led by a brilliant young general named Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov's pioneering use of massed armor and combined arms to defeat the Japanese in 1939 was little known in the West at that time and predated the same tactics that would become the German Blitzkrieg in 1940.
With the Japanese at war with the U.S., the Soviets no longer feared a Japanese attack in the east and freed those troops to move west to face the Germans. The time it took for those reinforcements to shift west was the time the Germans had to seize one or more of their primary objectives and consolidate their forces around it. Knowing that the Japanese would, at some point, go to war with the Americans, Hitler had hoped accomplish this before that eventuality happened. The Germans had petitioned the Japanese to delay attacking the Americans and attack the Soviets instead. But after the pasting they received from Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese were having none of that. Their attack on the U.S. was based upon their need for resources in southeast Asia to support their war effort in China (their offensive there had reached a standstill). They needed the Americans and the Europeans out of the region to grab those resources.
So, the Germans were under a tight deadline in their invasion of the Soviet Union. Because of this timeline, they needed to concentrate their main thrust on one of the three primary objectives. The thrusts towards the other objectives would still be necessary to protect the others' flanks. But obtaining those other objectives could wait.
The initial decision was that prime importance should be placed upon the drive for Moscow. This made good sense as Moscow was centrally located. There were not many wartime resources in the area. But it was the major national hub for roads and railroads throughout the country. With Moscow secured, the Germans would have a centralized point deep within the country to ship troops, supplied and munitions either north or south as needed. From there, they could support the taking of the next two objectives in order. Army Group Center would receive the most resources in their drive on Moscow. Army Group South was given second priority in their drive on Stalingrad. And Army Group North was given the third priority.
This plan initially went well. In the initial drive, Army Group Center was reportedly able to reach with about 40 miles of Moscow, despite worsening weather conditions, layers of Soviet field works, and Soviet counterattacks which slowed their advance. Army Group North was able to encircle Leningrad and was content to lay siege there until they were moved up on the priority list. Army Group South made great gains through the Ukraine. And this was the situation when Pearl Harbor took place. By that time, new campaigns in the Soviet Union would have to wait until late spring of 1942 due to weather conditions.
This was where the Germans changed their main objective. Rather than pursuing the drive on Moscow, they developed plans for a two pronged attack on the other objectives: Operation Nordlicht to seize Leningrad and Case Blue to seize the oil-rich Caucasus region and Stalingrad. Nordlicht was eventually cancelled due to a Soviet offensive in the area which was repelled. Case Blue went forward, initially to tremendous success. They took the Caucasus region, which Hitler coveted for the needed oil. But they had to seize Stalingrad to consolidate the gains and to serve as a logistics hub. They almost succeeded. But the Soviet defenders held out long enough for Zhukov and the eastern forces to arrive and encircle the German 6th Army in Operations Uranus and Little Saturn.
The forces were there for the Germans to accomplish what they set out to do. However, the timing and deployment undermined their goals.
I am not going to take the time to read all of this, but I am sure you are wrong about something in there.
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