Top 10 Reasons Why Hitler Lost WWII

[Bengalzona]

(01-27-2016, 10:59 PM)fredtoast Wrote: Moving large number of troops, weapons, and armor over long distances burned up resources that could be better used on the battlefield.

The military planning got worse and worse as Hitler lost his shit.  But their biggest mistake was trying too take too much territory too fast.  It wasn't like he was liberating the masses from oppressive leaders or uniting a group of people with some shared religious beliefs.  So the citizens had no reason to support the invading forces.  It takes lots of resources to occupy captured areas when they have no reason to support the invaders.   In fact sometimes it can take more resources to hold the land than it did to overthrow its government with military force.

The Germans failure in the Soviet Union wasn't because they didn't have enough troops, weapons or armor. It was a matter of seizing key objectives deep within the country in a timely manner: Moscow (Army Group Center), Stalingrad (Army Group South) and Leningrad (Army Group North). Time was their enemy. The Germans were well aware that if they did not seize at least one of these key strategic points before the Soviets could fully mobilized and also shift troops from the eastern portion of the country, then they would face a growing wave troops weapons and armor that they could not hope to match regardless of whether they had moved the few divisions tying up British and later American forces in North Africa and Italy to Russia or not. And while they did not know specifically when their 'deadline' was for accomplishing this task, they had a good rough idea. The clock started ticking on Dec. 7, 1941.

The German High Command in 1941 was not so worried about the Americans entering the conflict. They knew it would take the Americans years to get to Western Europe. When Hitler declared war on the U.S. following Pearl Harbor, it was so that his submarine force could freely attack American shipping and transports and to make any American move across the Atlantic extremely costly. This almost occurred. What the High Command was most worried about was hordes of Soviet troops being sent west to engage the Germans from eastern Soviet Union. The Soviets had maintained several of their best armies in the east to protect against sudden attack from Japan.

The Soviets had a good reason to do this. In 1939, a force of 80,000 Japanese of the Kwantung Army invaded Soviet-controlled Mongolia from Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. At the Battle of Khalkin Gol, the Japanese force was enveloped and eliminated by a Soviet force led by a brilliant young general named Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov's pioneering use of massed armor and combined arms to defeat the Japanese in 1939 was little known in the West at that time and predated the same tactics that would become the German Blitzkrieg in 1940.

With the Japanese at war with the U.S., the Soviets no longer feared a Japanese attack in the east and freed those troops to move west to face the Germans. The time it took for those reinforcements to shift west was the time the Germans had to seize one or more of their primary objectives and consolidate their forces around it. Knowing that the Japanese would, at some point, go to war with the Americans, Hitler had hoped accomplish this before that eventuality happened. The Germans had petitioned the Japanese to delay attacking the Americans and attack the Soviets instead. But after the pasting they received from Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese were having none of that. Their attack on the U.S. was based upon their need for resources in southeast Asia to support their war effort in China (their offensive there had reached a standstill). They needed the Americans and the Europeans out of the region to grab those resources.

So, the Germans were under a tight deadline in their invasion of the Soviet Union. Because of this timeline, they needed to concentrate their main thrust on one of the three primary objectives. The thrusts towards the other objectives would still be necessary to protect the others' flanks. But obtaining those other objectives could wait.

The initial decision was that prime importance should be placed upon the drive for Moscow. This made good sense as Moscow was centrally located. There were not many wartime resources in the area. But it was the major national hub for roads and railroads throughout the country. With Moscow secured, the Germans would have a centralized point deep within the country to ship troops, supplied and munitions either north or south as needed. From there, they could support the taking of the next two objectives in order. Army Group Center would receive the most resources in their drive on Moscow. Army Group South was given second priority in their drive on Stalingrad. And Army Group North was given the third priority.

This plan initially went well. In the initial drive, Army Group Center was reportedly able to reach with about 40 miles of Moscow, despite worsening weather conditions, layers of Soviet field works, and Soviet counterattacks which slowed their advance. Army Group North was able to encircle Leningrad and was content to lay siege there until they were moved up on the priority list. Army Group South made great gains through the Ukraine. And this was the situation when Pearl Harbor took place. By that time, new campaigns in the Soviet Union would have to wait until late spring of 1942 due to weather conditions.

This was where the Germans changed their main objective. Rather than pursuing the drive on Moscow, they developed plans for a two pronged attack on the other objectives: Operation Nordlicht to seize Leningrad and Case Blue to seize the oil-rich Caucasus region and Stalingrad. Nordlicht was eventually cancelled due to a Soviet offensive in the area which was repelled. Case Blue went forward, initially to tremendous success. They took the Caucasus region, which Hitler coveted for the needed oil. But they had to seize Stalingrad to consolidate the gains and to serve as a logistics hub. They almost succeeded. But the Soviet defenders held out long enough for Zhukov and the eastern forces to arrive and encircle the German 6th Army in Operations Uranus and Little Saturn.

The forces were there for the Germans to accomplish what they set out to do. However, the timing and deployment undermined their goals.