01-12-2020, 10:53 PM
Last night in Baltimore the Tennessee Titans surprisingly defeated the heavily favored Baltimore Ravens while limiting Lamar Jackson’s impact on the outcome of the game. I watched this game carefully and the scheme Titans’ defensive coordinator Dean Pees concocted to stop Lamar Jackson wasn’t obvious at first but after about three offensive Baltimore possessions I finally figured it out.
Most teams try to encircle Lamar Jackson with a combination of edge rush and a blitz which happen simultaneously with six defensive players. The Ravens can handle that by single teaming blocks on each rusher or blitzing linebacker while Lamar uses his speed and agility to escape to either run or throw.
Dean Pees came up with, as best as I can describe it, a “two wave” delayed second rush. At the snap, the Titans’ defensive line along with maybe one linebacker do their usual stunts, rushes, or in the case of the linebacker, a normal edge blitz. That’s four initial rushers instead of six, so the Ravens’ offensive line reacts by double teaming two rushers and/or blitzing linebackers.
Here’s the wrinkle: Two seconds later a second rush comes in composed of a linebacker or two or a linebacker and a cornerback. Now the Ravens’ linemen, already engaged with rushers or blitzers have to either break off their block and try to stop someone coming for Lamar Jackson in the second wave or just let them through. It was a Catch-22: No matter what the Baltimore offensive linemen did, Lamar was under pressure and took an unusual amount of sacks, threw inaccurately, ran sideways instead of his usual forward, or had to throw the ball away.
Did the “two wave” scheme totally stop Lamar and the Ravens? Of course not; they’re too good. What Dean Pees did was limit Jackson’s impact enough to sufficiently slow the Ravens’ offense to a manageable speed — especially on those failed attempts on fourth down where Jackson kept the ball.
Most teams try to encircle Lamar Jackson with a combination of edge rush and a blitz which happen simultaneously with six defensive players. The Ravens can handle that by single teaming blocks on each rusher or blitzing linebacker while Lamar uses his speed and agility to escape to either run or throw.
Dean Pees came up with, as best as I can describe it, a “two wave” delayed second rush. At the snap, the Titans’ defensive line along with maybe one linebacker do their usual stunts, rushes, or in the case of the linebacker, a normal edge blitz. That’s four initial rushers instead of six, so the Ravens’ offensive line reacts by double teaming two rushers and/or blitzing linebackers.
Here’s the wrinkle: Two seconds later a second rush comes in composed of a linebacker or two or a linebacker and a cornerback. Now the Ravens’ linemen, already engaged with rushers or blitzers have to either break off their block and try to stop someone coming for Lamar Jackson in the second wave or just let them through. It was a Catch-22: No matter what the Baltimore offensive linemen did, Lamar was under pressure and took an unusual amount of sacks, threw inaccurately, ran sideways instead of his usual forward, or had to throw the ball away.
Did the “two wave” scheme totally stop Lamar and the Ravens? Of course not; they’re too good. What Dean Pees did was limit Jackson’s impact enough to sufficiently slow the Ravens’ offense to a manageable speed — especially on those failed attempts on fourth down where Jackson kept the ball.
![[Image: 4CV0TeR.png]](https://i.imgur.com/4CV0TeR.png)
