Do you believe; and why?

[Lucidus]

(05-21-2019, 02:44 PM)Dill Wrote: Actually, I am speaking of "know" with an eye to the history of philosophy, and of "demonstrable certainty"--the latter term begging the question of "demonstrable."

In my view you are framing the question of whether god/the supernatural exists as an empirical test, while at the same time adopting a conception of "certain" knowledge (and agnosticism regarding which) embedded in a long (Ancient and Medieval) metaphysical discourse about matters beyond experience. The latter poses answers to questions of knowledge--e.g., can two angels can occupy the same space?--in apodictic terms on the order of analytic (e.g., mathematical and/or logical) necessity. 

This metaphysical discourse continues into modern times, but as theology, alongside a modern philosophy which breaks from it rather decisively from it in the 17th-18th centuries, e.g., Spinoza, Hume, Kant.  The cumulative effect of their work is to move questions about the existence of god/the supernatural out of the realm of possible knowledge.

You might respond--"well there you go: agnostics!" But its more than that. It is the death of "god" as a living philosophical question.

Because the ground of knowledge has shifted from metaphysical deduction to  induction based upon experience, which deals with probability, you can always claim that such knowledge is never 100% certain.

But in this context, the claim "we cannot know for certain" can have pernicious effects, especially the confusion of empirical and non empirical "knowledge," which hampers our ability to form judgments of relevance and priority--or worse embrace equivocations which run counter to the ends of philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Below is an example
If one has already experienced rain, then wondering whether it will rain tomorrow is rather different from wondering whether the supernatural exists, though one can pose conditions for determining the truth or falsity of such claims with equal ease.

In your sense of the word "know," one can posit a multiplicity of claims which cannot be proven 100% false--there is not only a dragon in your garage, but an invisible mouse in your pocket, and both used to work at that McDonald's on the far side of the moon. It is possible the evidence for these claims has "existed all along" but we have not found it yet. That we have not found it yet does not mean it does not exist. etc. The number of such "possible" truths is infinite and, I would add, infinitely IMprobable.

The problem of sorting knowledge/truth claims is especially acute now, I think, in the age of Trump, when absence of evidence proves no barrier to conspiracy theories in a public sphere where no one can be "100% sure" that the Clinton's didn't kill Vince Foster and Obama wasn't born in Kenya, but they can doubt there was a moon landing or that Russians interfered with the US elections.
NB: enjoying the discussion, Lucidus. I think you raise serious questions that I hope I am not dismissing.

As to the rain example: 

I was attempting to demonstrate the difference in certain knowledge and justified belief, or lack thereof. 

I must been agnostic in terms of whether I know for sure that it will rain tomorrow because I lack certain knowledge that it will.

However, I can have a justifiable "belief" that it will rain tomorrow based on evidence based conclusions.

You are correct that my view posits that no claim can be proven to be 100% false. However, it does not automatically follow that that any one of all possible claims can in fact be true. 

Stating that no instance of X can be proven impossible, does not state that any possible instance of X is true. 

My interest is more in terms of what is most reasonable and justified to believe in the absence of 100% certainty. In the case of God, my position is to say that we can't currently know, and may never be able to know, if a God actually exists or not. If I accept that I can't know with 100% certainty, then I must decide if I have a solid justification and reasoning process to believe in God, without said certainty. If I can't do so, then I can't actively believe in God, but it doesn't necessarily follow that I believe there is no God.

I feel we must admit that we can't know things with 100% certainty. Once we accept that reality, we must then rely on as many evidences and demonstrable proofs as possible in order to formulate active beliefs. If we don't have those available as proper justification, I think we should avoid actively believing something until which time there is reason to reasonably cause such belief.

I can't establish that gravity is 100% real. However, it seems to be demonstrable, repeatable and predictable in a way that suggest it's rationale and justifiable to believe it is extremely likely to be real. 

On the other hand, I can't establish with 100% certainty that Trump is not a great, moral, empathetic human being somewhere deep inside. However, based on his words, actions and behaviors, there would certainly seem to be evidence and reasonable justification to think that it's extremely unlikely to be the case. 

I would also like to address Kant in my next post, when I have more time, if you would open for that, as there are things I completely agree with him on and other areas where I (and many others) part ways with him conclusions.